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This thesis focuses on the study of allocation mechanisms and pricing schemes
for the design and analysis of competitive electricity markets. Motivated
by the increasing demand-side participation in high- and low-voltage power
grids, we consider two-sided competition models where a finite group of pro-
ducers and consumers compete through scalar-parameterized supply offers
and demand bids. Acting as a smooth approximation to supply offers used
in practice, scalar-parameterized offers greatly facilitate mathematical anal-
ysis while preserving the primary determinants and mechanisms by which
market power is exercised in electricity markets. In the framework of a
pool-based market, characterized by a central dispatch and pricing mech-
anism, when strategic, capacity-constrained suppliers face strategic, price-
responsive consumers, we show that market allocative efficiency loss and
price markup at the Nash equilibrium are bounded. We demonstrate anal-
ogous efficiency bounds in the study of inter-area electricity markets where
we exploit scalar-parameterized offers to model budget-constrained price ar-
bitrageurs that compete against affine inter-area price spreads. Our analysis
provides important insights on the type of behavior that may occur at the
equilibrium including the pivotal role assumed by certain players, the im-
pacts of aggregate liquidity and uncertainty as well financial positions in
other electricity markets. Through the application of reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms we demonstrate that players can discover their equilibrium
actions even when they know little to nothing about the game setting.
The simplicity of scalar-parameterized supply offers that grant market ac-
tors’ one-dimensional action spaces while properly constraining their strate-
gic flexibility, render such offer/bid structures an attractive candidate for the
expansion of electricity markets to distribution grids. Motivated by the rapid
proliferation of distributed energy resources that increasingly hold value for
the grid either as power suppliers or flexible demand, we leverage scalar-
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parameterized supply offers together with appropriate pricing schemes to
design a pool-based market for the retail sector. Our goal is complicated by
the underlying physics of distribution grids that render the central dispatch
problem, in its full generality, non-linear and non-convex. To get around this
difficulty, we exploit semidefinite relaxations of the optimal power flow prob-
lem and leverage duality theory to define prices for electricity as the optimal
Lagrange multipliers of nodal real and reactive power balance constraints.
We demonstrate that such prices stand on sound economic principles that
together with scalar-parameterized offers/bids, constitute a comprehensive
mechanism for the expansion of markets to the low-voltage side of the elec-
tric power grid.
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This chapter presents the motivation for the thesis, gives the outline of the
chapters, and states the original contributions of the thesis. There are no ded-
icated chapters covering a literature review or to establish notation. Rather,
the literature is reviewed and notation is established in each chapter and
section where it is appropriate.
1.1 Electricity Markets: Where They Stand and
Where They Are Progressing
Spot pricing of electricity [1, 2] laid the theoretical foundations for the re-
structuring of wholesale electricity markets. The underlying purpose for
restructuring the power sector is, at least in theory, to unleash the forces
of competition, improve efficiency and eventually reduce the costs for con-
sumers. Decades of experience with restructuring has led to a bid-based,
security constrained unit commitment and economic dispatch model as the
reference paradigm for wholesale electricity market design, closely following
the guidelines of the original theory.
Restructured electricity markets are, typically, administered by a central
authority such as regional transmission organizations (RTOs) or indepen-
dent system operators (ISOs) that are responsible for clearing the market
while ensuring the stable and reliable operation of the power system. Figure
1.1 illustrates geographical areas in which organized electricity markets are
operated by an ISO/RTO, henceforth referred to as system operator (SO).
Each SO-operated electricity market reflects a two-settlement system with
day-ahead markets (DAMs) and balancing real-time markets (RTMs). The
DAM clears to meet the bid-in load for each hour of the day, one day in
advance. Power schedules and locational marginal prices (LMPs) are cal-
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Figure 1.1: RTOs/ISOs in North America. Uncolored regions represent states
that operate under the vertically integrated utility paradigm.
culated from the market-clearing process and these price-quantity pairs are
settled for all market participants. To reflect changes that may occur be-
tween day-ahead and real-time, the RTM is used to re-dispatch resources to
meet imbalances caused by variability and uncertainty, induced largely by
demand fluctuations and intermittent renewable generation.
Organized wholesale electricity markets have, indeed, contributed to re-
duction of electricity costs and encouraged innovation through competition.
For example, PJM reports that their market has saved consumers at least
$3.2 billion a year by integrating more efficient resources and ensuring the
lowest production costs [3]. Figure 1.2 illustrates how wholesale electricity
prices have remained largely flat since the introduction of markets in 1999,
while the generation mix is about 30% less carbon-intensive than ten years
ago. Even utilities located in fully regulated states benefit from organized
markets as they can offer or purchase electricity in the market when it makes
economic sense. However, there is growing concern that the ability of existing
electricity market designs to continue to deliver such benefits will drastically
diminish, as radical developments and transformations are under way.
This thesis focuses on three major forces propelling the overall transforma-
tion in the power industry and electricity markets: (1) massive deployment of
large-scale renewable generation, (2) increased participation of the consumer-
side, and (3) widespread adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs) in
the low-voltage grid. Such developments—facilitated by the deployment of
rapidly improving technologies that travel down the cost curve—raise nu-
2
(a) (b)
Figure 1.2: Benefits of organized electricity markets: wholesale prices have
remained flat (left) and average emissions have steadily declined in PJM
(right).
merous markets design questions and require a growing toolbox of solutions,
a set of which is presented in this thesis.
Integration of grid-scale renewable resources such as wind and solar is
accelerating (see Figure 1.3) and the trend is likely to continue. Such re-
sources are uncertain, intermittent and largely uncontrollable, i.e., cannot
be dispatched on demand. Such variability makes it challenging to balance
demand and supply across a transmission-constrained power network at all
times. Current electricity markets accommodate said uncertainty in a rather
ad-hoc manner, e.g. by planning for the nominal scenario and choosing fixed
reserve margins to deal with forecast errors. Unfortunately, deepening renew-
able penetrations ultimately lead to greater forecast errors and prohibitively
large reserve margins [4, 5].
Unpredictability and variability are sometimes interpreted as “missing
markets” problems. This has been largely addressed through the introduc-
tion of ancillary service markets. However, having separate markets may cre-
ate opportunity for arbitrage or exercise of market power. Ideally, markets
should optimize against uncertainty at the forward stage, i.e., DAM, with
the explicit incorporation of uncertainty and produce price signals that in-
ternalize said uncertainty. Any such mechanism should yield efficient market
allocations and guarantee revenue adequacy, at least in expectation. More-
over, it should ensure bounded efficiency losses in market allocations and
societal welfare when participants exercise market power.
Besides suitable modeling and analytical tools, increasing coordination
across larger geographic areas with diverse resources and weather patterns
facilitates renewable resource integration. To harness the low-cost and clean
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energy from these resources we need an almost seamless operation of the
interconnected grid; that is an efficient way to transfer power across different
grids to move more renewable generation from the middle of the country to
the coasts. As such, consumers can receive the benefits of these resources
no matter how far away they are located. Moreover, a dynamic and effi-
cient scheduling of power across different regions, allows for real-time reserve
provision improving reliability, which is becoming increasingly critical due
to the variable output of these renewable resources. Even systems that are
not part of organized markets can benefit from regional coordination. For
example, CAISO and PacifiCorp formed an Energy Imbalance Market (EIM)
in 2014 to “manage resource deviations, smoothing out power flows so that
renewable energy is effectively integrated into the grid” [6]. The EIM covers
fourteen western states, comprising mostly of energy balancing authorities
that are not organized into regional markets.
Figure 1.3: Annual change in U.S. electricity generation by source.
The gathered momentum with grid-scale renewable generation is spread-
ing swiftly down the electric power value chain, as grids in many regions
become increasingly decentralized and host a growing number of distributed
energy resources (DERs). A DER is “any resource on the distribution system
that produces electricity and is not otherwise included in the formal NERC
definition of the Bulk Electric System (BES)” [7]. This encompasses many
resource types and technologies such as solar photovoltaics (PV), combined
heat and power (CHP), small-scale wind turbines, energy storage, demand
response as well as electric vehicles (EV) and EV charges.
While once viewed primarily as a threat to utility business models, DERs
are beginning to be considered as valuable tools to: reduce carbon emissions,
access new revenue streams for utilities and other providers, defer investment
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in transmission and distribution infrastructure, improve grid efficiency and
asset utilization for utilities and customers, and fulfill renewable portfolio
standards (RPS). DERs could develop into a significant tool for managing
integrated grid-scale renewable resources. For example, SOs could reach
behind the meter to tap into customers’ largely unused storage devices or
demand response to smooth out fluctuations in renewable output. In the
wholesale market, demand response at times of high renewable availability,
helps mitigate the revenue slump caused by renewable suppliers with near-
zero marginal costs [8]. However, the majority of demand flexibility is due
to residential and commercial customers connected at the low-voltage side
of the grid [9] and are currently largely excluded from wholesale markets.
To harness said benefits of DERs, the industry needs first to develop the
regulatory and market structures necessary to access, monitor and manage
these resources.
The challenge involves efforts to simulate, quantify, and monetize the value
created by DERs. Since these resources are connected to the distribution
side of the grid, pricing energy and ancillary services for the distribution
network is becoming an increasingly important aspect of electricity market
design. The integration of DERs into a market clearing process raises nu-
merous market design questions including bid/offer structures, products to
be traded, network model, pricing and settlement schemes, interactions with
wholesale markets and so forth. This thesis advocates that redesigning and
expanding electricity markets is not only imperative but it constitutes a cost-
effective solution to manage the challenges posed by these trends. Our goal
is to provide market tools and solutions to appropriately model, analyze and
redesign existing or future electricity markets.
1.2 Outline of Thesis
This thesis consists of six chapters (including introduction and conclusion),
which concentrate on two main areas: first, the introduction of market mech-
anisms that are suitable for modeling and analytical purposes and second,
the deployment of such mechanisms for the design of comprehensive market
frameworks. To measure the performance of the aforementioned mechanisms
we study the market outcome under two specific conditions: (i) market par-
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ticipants are pure price-takers, i.e., the market resembles conditions of perfect
competition, and (ii) participants exercise market power and distort market
outcomes. As such, we make extensive use of concepts and tools from welfare
economics and game theory.
Chapter 2 introduces the market mechanism that is utilized for market
design and analysis throughout this thesis. It consists of a particular family
of scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids that allow suppliers
and consumers to declare their private information in the market. We con-
sider a two-sided market where both suppliers and consumers compete for
a product with the allocations determined by a central manager or market
operator. Our model incorporates production capacity constraints and min-
imum inelastic demand requirements. We explicitly show that under perfect
competition, there exist prices such that the mechanism yields allocations
that maximize social welfare. When market participants are strategic, we
explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium and the market allocation at
the equilibrium. We prove that strategic interactions cannot cripple market
performance and provide bounds on the welfare loss and price markup at
the equilibrium. We conclude the chapter by showing that efficient alloca-
tions can be sustained for a market that operates under (convex) network
constraints.
In Chapter 3 we demonstrate the analytical prowess of scalar-parameterized
supply offers. To that end, we investigate regional, market-based, coordi-
nation mechanisms such as coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS). We
discuss the mechanics of CTS and we set up a theoretical framework that we
use as the proxy of CTS markets. We demonstrate how scalar-parameterized
offers can be effectively utilized to model pure price-arbitrageurs facing inter-
regional prices spreads, which we camouflage as demand functions. The effec-
tiveness of said mechanism is explicitly illustrated by its capability to reveal
the well-documented flaws of CTS: (1) lack of market liquidity, (2) trans-
action fees, and (3) SO’s forecast errors. We explicitly quantify the impact
of strategic participants by deriving the market allocation at the Nash equi-
librium. Moreover, employing simple reinforcement learning algorithms we
show that such outcomes can be learned through repeated interactions of
players with CTS markets.
Moving in the direction of electricity market design, in Chapter 4 we fo-
cus on price formation and settlement schemes for electricity markets with
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full consideration of the power network. We start off with the non-convex,
non-linear, market clearing model referred to as alternating current optimal
power flow model (AC-OPF). Motivated by recent work on distribution LMPs
(DLMPs), we explore economic properties of a pricing scheme that utilizes
optimal Lagrange multipliers from a semidefinite programming (SDP) relax-
ation of AC-OPF. We call these prices RLMPs. We show explicitly how such
prices possess a number of nice properties: RLMPs support efficient market
equilibria, guarantee revenue adequacy and minimize a form of side-payments
when the duality gap between AC and SDP is nonzero.
RLMPs together with the scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand
bids are the primary constituents for the design of a comprehensive electric-
ity market for distribution networks. In Chapter 5, we set up this market
framework, which explicitly takes into consideration the characteristics of
distribution networks. Here, we define appropriate DLMP price signals (a
special case of RLMPs) that can be used to compensate resources connected
at the distribution level, such as DERs. The said prices support efficient
market allocations and ensure, under mild conditions, that the SO remains
solvent after settling all transactions. The market framework presented in
Chapter 5 constitutes a comprehensive effort to design appropriate mecha-
nisms for low-voltage power customers to offer their services to the grid and
receive compensation, while a central entity ensures the secure operation of
the grid.
1.3 Original Contribution of the Thesis
First of all, to the best knowledge of the author, this thesis is the first piece
of work that presents a comprehensive electricity market framework for dis-
tribution networks with explicitly defined offer/bid structures and clearing
mechanisms. Moreover, the analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 6, is a gener-
alization of earlier efforts that focused on properties of scalar-parameterized
supply offers when the demand-side is perfectly inelastic. In this thesis,
consumers are active participants in two ways: submit individual demand
bids—the dual version of said offers—and in aggregate as a smooth, elastic
demand function in CTS. In particular, said offer/bid structures can effec-
tively model:
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• Controllable power producers (e.g., natural gas, fossil fueled genera-
tion) with capacity constraints
• Renewable generation resources with uncertain supply and maximum
production capacity




• Generation assets and consumers connected in three-phase unbalanced
distribution networks
Several results presented in this thesis are joint work with other research
collaborators. Such results are merely stated for completeness. Whenever
this is the case, we mention it explicitly and cite the relevant work for refer-
ence to the reader. In detail the original contributions of this thesis are:
• Section 2.3, Theorem 1: We prove that two-sided markets with scalar-
parameterized offers/bids, support efficient market equilibria under
pure price-taking participants. This result illustrates that when market
actors are non-strategic and are restricted to use a particular family of
bids/offers, then the market yields allocations that (i) maximize soci-
ety’s welfare, and (ii) are incentive compatible.
• Section 2.4, Theorem 2: For the two-sided market framework, we es-
tablish existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for strategic
market participants. Furthermore, Theorem 2 provides a computation-
ally efficient way to characterize the Nash equilibrium and the market
allocation. This is achieved by solving a convex program.
• Section 2.5, Theorem 3: Under strategic interactions, the misrepre-
sentation of private information has the potential to induce market
allocations that are suboptimal to the efficient outcome. Theorem 3
explicitly characterizes the bounds on welfare loss and price markup
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at the Nash equilibrium. This result demonstrates that the scalar-
parameterized functions do not cripple market performance when par-
ticipants are strategic.
• Section 3.3, Theorem 4: In the analysis of CTS markets, we establish
sufficient conditions that guarantee existence of a Nash equilibrium in
competition models with scalar-parameterized supply functions facing
elastic demand functions.
• Section 3.4, Proposition 1: For affine demand models, we characterize
the unique Nash equilibrium of the CTS game and quantify the impacts
of market liquidity on scheduling efficiency. Specifically, CTS outcome
yields efficient allocations when market liquidity is high. In the inter-
mediate liquidity regime, efficiency loss of CTS is at most 25%. When
market liquidity is prohibitively low, inefficient outcomes are a result
of lack of liquidity and not the strategic interactions of players.
• Section 3.4.2: The Nash equilibrium of CTS can be discovered through
the application of the upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithm. We
apply UCB to a game with five players, where each player is given a
discrete set of actions, including the Nash equilibrium strategy. Play-
ers’ actions converge within a finite number of plays. To the best of
the author’s knowledge, this is the first application of UCB to supply
function competition with scalar-parameterized models.
• Section 3.5, Proposition 2: This result demonstrates the coupling of
CTS with virtual transactions in other energy markets. To the best of
the author’s knowledge this is the first analysis that highlights potential
uneconomic bidding due to players holding combined positions in CTS
and other energy markets.
• Section 3.6, Proposition 3: This result reflects a somewhat counter-
intuitive outcome: the incentives of CTS bidders are aligned in a way
that allows them to correct SO’s forecasts or systematic bias. This
result is counter-intuitive in the sense that, in electricity markets, the
SO is, typically, viewed as the ultimate authority that has the best
information on the system’s state, and thus strategic participants are
expected to drive markets to suboptimal outcomes. To the best of the
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author’s knowledge, this is the first theoretical result that contradicts
perceived suboptimality of CTS. Moreover, Proposition 3 demonstrates
the impact of transaction fees on achieving the goal of CTS: to con-
verge prices between neighboring markets. Our analysis demonstrates
that transaction fees act as barrier to trade and prevents bidders from
offering their entire budgets.
• Section 4.3, Theorem 5: We show that RLMPs, defined as the Lagrange
multipliers of an optimal solution to the SDP dispatch problem, support
efficient market equilibria and guarantee revenue adequacy under mild
conditions. Moreover, we explicitly compute the duality gap between
AC and SDP economic dispatch problems, and show that it comprises
two terms: the lost opportunity cost (LOC) and the product revenue
shortfall (PRS). Theorem 5 establishes that RLMPs minimize a form of
side-payments whenever the duality gap is nonzero, a feature common
to convex-hull pricing (CHP).
• Section 5.3: We define DLMPs for real and reactive power in multi-
phase distribution networks. That is, there is a price for electricity
for each phase at every node in the network. Moreover, in Theorem
6, we combine DLMPs together with supply function competition in






We introduce the market mechanism that serves as the main tool to analyze
and design competitive electricity markets. We begin by considering a general
market setting where both suppliers and consumers compete for a product.
We restrict our attention to a particular family of supply offers and demand
bids referred to as scalar-parameterized offers/bids. We study properties of
said mechanism when market participants are pure price-takers, and when
they are strategic. The goal of the analysis presented here is to demonstrate
the strengths of scalar-parameterized offer/bid structures in the design and
analysis of any market and electricity markets in particular.
2.1 Supply Function Competition in Electricity
Markets
In wholesale electricity markets, the behavior of market participants has
been largely modeled and analyzed through the well-known Bertrand and
Cournot competition models, which are simple (degenerate) price/quantity
offer strategies [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. However, the Bertrand model
typically assumes that each participant is willing to supply the entire de-
mand, which may not be satisfied in a number of cases. Variations of the
Bertrand model with capacity constraints have been proposed, however, in
such settings pure Nash equilibria may not exist [18]. The Cournot model
has a number of appealing properties when studying oligopolies in markets
with relatively high demand elasticity. However, when demand elasticity
is low, Cournot competition may exhibit arbitrarily high welfare loss [19].
For day-ahead electricity markets in particular, pure quantity/price compe-
tition cannot adequately represent supply offers or demand bids of market
participants. In such markets power producers submit varying quantities at
11
successively higher prices and the demand-side specifies the quantity willing
to purchase at successively lower prices.
One is then forced to consider offer/bid structures that allow participants
more degrees of freedom to declare their preferences. The seminal work by
Klemperer and Meyer [20] demonstrated that in the absence of uncertainty
there exist an enormous multiplicity of equilibria in supply functions. Hence,
we must restrict attention to a particular family of supply functions. Lin-
ear supply functions make up another candidate used to model electricity
markets—although incorporating capacity constraints into linear supply of-
fers is not straightforward [21]. Moreover, arbitrary high-efficiency loss at
the Nash equilibrium is possible, particularly when suppliers have highly
heterogeneous cost functions [22].
What is then a suitable mechanism for electricity markets? We answer
this question in conjunction to the major transformations currently taking
place in electric power systems. In particular, the emergence of a poten-
tial retail marketplace [23] incites greater demand-side participation all the
while higher grid-scale renewable generation and DERs increase uncertainty
in market outcomes. Hence, the ideal candidate for offer/bid structures: (i)
must provide enough flexibility to participants to declare their preferences
against a range of possible market outcomes, (ii) is simple enough to facili-
tate widespread participation in retail and wholesale sectors, (iii) facilitates
modeling of the demand-side without severely complicating analysis, (iv)
sustains competitive outcomes, and (v) does not cripple market performance
when participants exercise market power.
In this thesis, we restrict our attention on a specific family of supply of-
fers and demand bids, referred to as scalar-parameterized supply/demand
functions, studied in [24, 25]. The specific family of supply functions allows
market actors to have one-dimensional action spaces, when faced with a sin-
gle market price. Such market mechanisms are simple to implement and are
considered to be fair among market participants. In [26], the authors show
that said mechanisms possess a number of attractive properties including
bounded price of anarchy and price markup at the Nash equilibrium. The
family of supply functions considered here is a capacitated version similar to
those employed by [27, 28]. Such supply functions prohibit situations where
firms can offer in the market beyond their means. Understanding the impact
of capacity constraints is critical in many industries, including the electric
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power sector where the importance and irreversibility of investment on pro-
duction capacities impose long-term decisions. In the sequel, we demonstrate
why scalar-parameterized offer/bids is the best-possible mechanism available
for certain market structures that exhibits a number of desired properties.
Notation: Let R denote the set of real numbers and R+ the set of non-
negative real numbers. Denote the transpose of a vector x ∈ Rn by xᵀ. Let
x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn−1 be the vector including all but the
ith element of x. Finally, denote by 1 the vector of all ones with appropriate
size.
2.2 A Two-Sided Market on Copperplate Power
System
We consider a market that consists of a collection of consumers I, a collection
of suppliers J , and a central entity or market manager. In particular,
• Consumers: Consumer i ∈ I demands amount di, which must be
greater than some minimum inelastic demand requirement d0i . Each
consumer derives utility Ui(di) from consuming amount di. For each
i ∈ I, Ui is assumed smooth, concave and strictly increasing for di ≥ d0i
with Ui(d
0
i ) = 0.
• Suppliers: Supplier j ∈ J offers amount sj, which must lie below
some maximum (nameplate) production capacity denoted by κ0j . Each
supplier incurs costs Cj(sj) for producing quantity sj. For each j ∈ J ,
Cj(sj) is assumed smooth, convex and strictly increasing with Cj(sj) ≥
0 for sj ≥ 0. Over the domain sj ≤ 0, Cj(sj) = 0.
• Market manager: The manager collects supply offers and demand
bids from market participants and implements a centralized market
mechanism that defines: (1) the amount each producer/consumer sup-
plies/demands, and (2) the market price and payments for every pro-
ducer/consumer.
The market manager would ideally like to compute a market allocation that
maximizes society’s welfare while operating within the constraints of the
individual participants. Let d ∈ R|I|+ and s ∈ R|J |+ denote the collection
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of demand and supply quantities, respectively. Then, the market manager
would like to solve the following program.














0 ≤ sj ≤ κ0j , (2.1c)
d0i ≤ di, (2.1d)
for each i ∈ I, j ∈ J ,
over the variables d, s. Any demand plan d and supply plan s constitutes
an efficient market allocation if it solves (2.1). Such allocations can be
determined if the market manager has perfect knowledge on the market and
all participants. However, Ui and Cj are, typically, private information and
thus, not available to the market manager. The first question we ask is:
Is there a mechanism that allows market participants to reveal their private
information in a way that yields efficient market allocations? In what follows,
we present such a mechanism based on scalar-parameterized supply functions
and demand bids.
Consider consumer i ∈ I that provides to the market manager demand









, θdi ≥ 0. (2.2)
The expression in (2.2) represents the quantity the consumer is willing to
buy, given the inelastic component d0i , the market price and the parameter
θdi . The inelastic demand d
0
i represents the minimum quantity the consumer
must be supplied while θdi /λ represents the price-responsive portion of their
demand. Note that the demand bid is decreasing in price, i.e., it is downward
sloping. Similarly, consider firm j ∈ J that submits to the market supply









, θsj ≥ 0. (2.3)
The supply offer (2.3) represents the quantity supplier j is willing to offer as
a function of price. The supply offer is further parameterized in the capacity
κ0j , which represents supplier j’s maximum production capacity. Observe
that as demand approaches its inelastic portion d0i , consumer i’s willingness
to buy approaches infinity. Similarly, as the supply quantity approaches firm
j’s maximum capacity κ0j , the requested market price grows unbounded.
Remark 1. A possible drawback of the class of supply functions in (2.3)
is that it allows market participants to offer negative quantities. Nothing
rules this out in the definition of the mechanism and suppliers may be rightly
nervous to agree in a mechanism with such a property. However, we will
show that such situations cannot arise at a market equilibrium, under both
competitive and strategic behavior.
Let θd = (θd1, . . . , θ
d
|I|) and θ
s = (θs1, . . . , θ
s
|J |) denote the collection of
demand bids and supply offers, respectively. The market manager chooses
price λ(θd,θs) > 0 to clear the market such that supply equals demand, i.e.,
∑
i∈I
D(θdi , λ) =
∑
j∈J
S(θsj , λ). (2.4)
Such choice is only possible when 1ᵀθd+1ᵀθs > 0 in which case the market
price is given by
λ(θd,θs) =
1ᵀθd + 1ᵀθs












j . We assume throughout that κ
0
|J | >
d0|I| and the market price is well-defined. In the case where 1
ᵀθd + 1ᵀθs = 0,
i.e., every market participant submits zero parameter, we adopt the following
conventions
D(0, 0) = d0i , ∀i ∈ I and S(0, 0) = κ0j , ∀j ∈ J . (2.6)
For markets with perfectly inelastic demand, the residual supply index
(RSI) is often adopted as a suitable indicator of market power. Precisely,
the RSI of firm j measures the capability of the aggregate market capacity—
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excluding that of j—to meet total inelastic demand. In the market model
considered here, the inelastic portion of demand is d0|I|. Mathematically, if
RSIj :=
κ0|J | − κ0j
d0|I|
is strictly less than one, then firm j is said to be pivotal. See [29] and [30] for
further details. As we show in Section 2.4, the presence of pivotal suppliers
is critical in the analysis of the market outcome under strategic interactions.
2.3 Perfect Competition
In this section, we study the market outcome assuming all market partici-
pants are pure price-takers. We aim to establish the existence and character-
ization of the market equilibrium taking into account the profit-maximizing
nature of suppliers and consumers.
Given market price λ > 0, each consumer maximizes the payoff
πi(θ
d










, i ∈ I. (2.7)
Similarly, each supplier maximizes
πj(θ
s
j , λ) = λS(θ
s
j , λ)− Cj(S(θsj , λ)), j ∈ J . (2.8)
We now proceed with our first result which shows that when consumers bid
in (2.2) and firms offer in (2.3) the mechanism supports an efficient market
equilibrium.
Theorem 1. There exists a market equilibrium (θd,?,θs,?, λ) satisfying
πi(θ
d,?
i , λ) ≥ πi(θdi , λ), ∀ θdi ≥ 0 and i ∈ I, (2.9a)
πj(θ
s,?
j , λ) ≥ πj(θsj , λ), ∀ θsj ≥ 0 and j ∈ J , (2.9b)
λ is given by (2.5). (2.9c)
Moreover, the supply plan s?j = S(θ
s,?
j , λ) for every j ∈ J and the demand
plan d?i = D(θ
d,?
i , λ) for every i ∈ I, constitute an efficient allocation.
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The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Section 2.7. According to Theorem
1, under perfect competition, suppliers and consumers maximize their payoffs
and the resulting market allocation is efficient. This implies that given price
λ, the firms have no incentive to deviate from supplying s? and consumers
have no incentive to deviate from buying d?. Thus, the competitive market
allocation is efficient and the market clearing price is the shadow price (or




j∈J sj. Therefore, at price
λ the marginal social benefit of additional output equals the marginal social
cost, which establishes the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
2.4 Strategic Consumers and Suppliers
In contrast to the price-taking model, we now consider a model where mar-
ket participants are price-anticipating. Price-anticipating suppliers and con-
sumers realize that the market price is a function of their actions and ad-
just their bids/offers accordingly. In particular, the payoff for the price-
















d0i − θdi . (2.10)
Note that the payoff of each consumer depends on the actions of all other
market participants that are collectively incorporated in the market price.
Similarly, firm j’s payoff depends on action θsj and the actions of all other

















We define the game G with I ∪ J denoting the set of players with strategy
spaces Θi = R+ and payoffs given by (2.10) and (2.11). Our goal is to study
the existence (and uniqueness) of the Nash equilibrium of G and provide

















d) ≥ πj(θsj , θ̂s−j, θ̂d), ∀ θsj ≥ 0 and j ∈ J .
We begin with the following result that illustrates how certain problem pa-
rameters influence the existence of a Nash equilibrium for G.
Lemma 1. G does not admit a Nash equilibrium if a pivotal supplier exists
in the market.
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Section 2.7. In effect, Lemma 1 implies
that when any |J |−1 firms cannot supply the entire inelastic demand in the
market, then there exists a pivotal supplier that faces a non-zero inflexible
demand that has infinite willingness to pay. This makes the suppliers’ payoff
grow unbounded with respect their action θs. Hence, a Nash equilibrium
cannot exist in this case. As a consequence of Lemma 1, there cannot exist
a Nash equilibrium with |J | = 1 since, by definition, the single supplier is
pivotal. In view of Lemma 1, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. RSIj > 1 for each firm j ∈ J .
Equipped with the previous observations, we present our main result that
explicitly characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of G.











, j ∈ J






, i ∈ I
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are given by the unique solution of the following convex program














0 ≤ sj ≤ κ0j , (2.12c)
d0i ≤ di, (2.12d)



























The proof of Theorem 2 is provided in Section 2.7. Computing Nash
equilibria is, in general, hard as shown in [31]. Theorem 2 establishes the
computation of the market allocation at the Nash equilibrium—and the Nash
equilibrium itself—through the solution of a convex program in (d, s) instead
of solving |J |+|I| problems in the actions (θd,θs), which can be cumbersome
depending on the structure of the utility and cost functions. The crux of The-
orem 2 is the construction of an appropriate convex program that yields the
market allocation at the Nash equilibrium—a technique closely related to the
use of potential functions in characterizing Nash equilibria ([32]). However,
the functions (2.13) and (2.14) are not potentials for G, since they depend on
the allocations and not on the players’ decisions. Hence, we cannot use these
functions to conclude anything about convergence of best response dynamics
to the Nash equilibrium. However, in Section 2.5, we exploit the structure
of Ûi and Ĉj to compute bounds on the efficiency loss and the price markup
observed at the Nash equilibrium.
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2.5 Efficiency Loss and Price Markup
The structure of the modified utility and cost functions allows us to make
a number of interesting observations about the behavior of strategic market
actors. First, note that since Cj(sj) are assumed convex and increasing, it
follows that Ĉj(sj) ≥ Cj(sj), ∀ sj ≥ 0. Similarly, since Ui(di) are concave and
increasing, for each consumer we have Ûi(di) ≤ Ui(di), ∀ di ≥ d0i . In effect,
strategic suppliers misrepresent their costs functions through Ĉj(sj), which
are greater than the true cost Cj(sj) at every sj. On the other hand, strategic
consumers misrepresent their utilities through Ûi(di), which are smaller than
the true utility Ui(di) at every di.
Furthermore, W(d̂, ŝ) ≤ W(d?, s?) since the maximum value of W occurs
at (d?, s?). However, in our next result, we show that the social welfare at
the Nash is bounded below and can be relatively close to the optimal value
provided some minimum flexible production capacity. In order to compute
bounds on price markups at the Nash equilibrium we utilize the Lerner index
[33], which we define as













The Lerner index measures a firm’s market power and it varies from zero
to one, with higher values indicating greater market power. The following
result summarizes the efficiency loss at the Nash equilibrium and the price
markups.
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and let κ0m = max{κ01, . . . , κ0|J |}.
Let (d?, s?) be the optimal allocation from (2.1) and (d̂, ŝ) be the market














































Finally, the Lerner index at the Nash equilibrium satisfies





The proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Section 2.7. In effect, Theorem 3
provides a lower bound on the social welfare at the Nash equilibrium and
an upper bound on the market price with respect to the true marginal cost
of suppliers. Notice that W(d̂, ŝ) is in the worst case 3/4 of the aggregate
utility less ζ/(ζ−κ0m) of the aggregate costs at the efficient allocation. We do
not claim this bound is tight; there may exist an even tighter bound on the
social welfare the computation of which we relegate to future work. Higher
values of ζ yield values of the social welfare at the Nash equilibrium closer to
W(d?, s?). The worst-case values for W(d̂, ŝ) arise when ζ → κ0m, although
it never reaches it. Intuitively, when the aggregate production capacity of
supply is relatively close to the total inelastic demand, then firms’ market
power increases over consumers, gradually inducing pivotalness for the sup-
plier with the maximum production capacity. Specifically, for ζ ∈ (κ0m, 2κ0m)
the efficiency loss can be arbitrarily high, similar to that derived by [27]
for a market with capacity-constrained suppliers. When ζ ∈ [2κ0m,∞) the
worst-case aggregate cost coefficient in (2.16) is equal to two and we re-
cover the worst-case bound of [26] derived for uncapacitated supply function
competition. Moreover, (2.17) shows that provided some minimum flexible
production capacity, the social welfare at the Nash equilibrium is no lower
than 3/4 of the aggregate utility less 4/3 of the aggregate cost at the effi-
cient allocation—not much lower than W(d?, s?). From (2.18) note that the
Lerner index is strictly less than one due to the non-pivotal supplier assump-
tion. As ζ grows large, LI(θ̂d, θ̂s) goes to zero, indicating less market power
on the supply side. As d0|I| approaches κ
0
|J |, LI(θ̂
d, θ̂s) grows large implying
high market power since there is little available capacity to supply anything
more than the total inelastic demand.
2.6 Illustrative Examples
In this section we provide numerical experiments to illustrate the behavior
of the social welfare under perfect competition and strategic interactions
21
0 10 20 30 40
















(d * , s * )
(a)




1 5 9 13 17















(d * , s * )
(c)
Figure 2.1: Plot (a) shows values of the social welfare with respect to ζ at
the efficient and Nash equilibrium allocations. In (b) we plot social wel-
fare bounds for (strategic) price-responsive and perfectly inelastic demand.
Plot (c) shows how the social welfare varies with respect to the number of
consumers.
with respect to specific problem parameters. As shown in Section 2.5, the
key parameter that affects social welfare is the total flexible capacity in the
market ζ.
Consider a market with |J | = 6 and |I| = 5. Let each consumer i ∈ I
have utility
Ui(di) := βi log(di), d
0
i = 1.
Note that the above utility function is strictly concave and increasing and
attains a minimum value Ui(d
0
i ) = 0 for every i ∈ I. Moreover, every supplier
















(di log(di)− di + 1) .



















Figures 2.1a and 2.1b illustrate how social welfare at the optimal and Nash
allocations varies with respect to ζ. For the experiments we assumed that the
vector of utility coefficients βi is [1, 1, 1.5, 2, 2] and of the cost coefficients αj is
[0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.5]. More specifically, we start with a value of κ0j = 1.1
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for every j ∈ J—just slightly higher than d0i to avoid pivotal suppliers—
and increase it gradually. Observe that the higher the value of ζ the closer
W(d̂, ŝ) is to W(d?, s?). On the other hand, the smaller ζ is, the higher the





For the special case in which the market has perfectly inelastic, non-strategic
demand, we utilize the worst-case market performance metric ρC , which is













Figure 2.1b demonstrates that the worst-case value of W(d̂, ŝ) occurs when
ζ = 1.6 ∈ (κ0m, 2κ0m) where the ratio ρS = 0.4. Immediately after ζ ∈
[2κ0m,∞), the ratio ρS jumps to 0.8 and stays above 0.9 after ζ ≥ 4κ0m. Note
that ρS lies everywhere above ρC except when ζ ∈ (κ0m, 2κ0m) where ρS = ρC .
This implies that although consumers are strategic, the market efficiency loss
is lower-bounded by the worst-case performance of a market with perfectly
inelastic demand. It remains to be shown whether this outcome holds more
broadly, for any choice of cost and utility functions. Finally, increasing the
number of consumers, while keeping the production capacity constant, widens
the disparity between W(d̂, ŝ) and W(d?, s?) as shown in Figure 2.1c. This
illustrates the effect of increasing the inelastic portion of demand and as
such inducing higher market power on the existing set of firms, which is also
captured by the Lerner index in (2.18).
2.7 Proofs
2.7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The crux of our derivations relies on Lagrangian duality to establish that the
equilibrium conditions of (2.7) and (2.8) together with (2.5) are equivalent to
the first-order optimality conditions of (2.1). We begin with the consumer’s
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problem. The payoff in (2.7) is concave in each player’s action θdi . Hence, the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions are both necessary and














≤ λ, if θd,?i = 0. (2.20b)
Each supplier’s payoff is concave in the action θsj . Moreover, an optimal




. If not, then it is easy to
show that Sj(θ
s




j . Therefore, such strategies cannot occur
at the equilibrium since they yield negative payoff. Therefore, an optimal














≥ λ, if 0 < θs,?j ≤ λκ0j . (2.21b)
We now turn to problem (2.1) solved by the market manager. Associate
the Lagrange multiplier λ with the equality constraint (2.1b). The objective
function is continuous and concave over a compact set. Therefore, there












≤ λ, if d?i = d0i . (2.22b)










≤ λ, if 0 < s?j ≤ κ0j . (2.23b)
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Note that λ > 0 since Ui and Cj are strictly increasing and there exists at
least one s?j > 0. If the pair (s




for every j ∈ J , then (θs, λ) satisfy (2.21) and θs ≥ 0. In effect (2.23) become
equivalent to (2.21).
Similarly, if the pair (d?, λ) satisfies (2.22) and we let θdi = λ(d
?
i − d0i )
then (θd, λ) satisfy (2.20) and θd ≥ 0. In this case, (2.22) become equivalent
to (2.20). Finally, the market clearing condition in (2.24) yields λ is given
by (2.5). Hence, (θd,θs, λ) is a market equilibrium. Now suppose that
(θd,?,θs,?, λ) satisfy (2.20),(2.21) and λ is given by (2.5). Let sj = S(θ
s,?
j , λ)
for j ∈ J and di = D(θs,?i , λ) for i ∈ I. Then, it is easy to verify that the
vector (d, s) satisfies (2.22)-(2.24). Therefore, (d, s) is an efficient allocation.
2.7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let supplier j be pivotal. Then it must hold
RSIj =
κ0|J | − κ0j
d0|I|
< 1, (2.25)
i.e., the total production capacity less that of j’s is less than the total inelastic












|I| − κ0|J |
κ0|J | − d0|I|









From (2.25) it follows that (2.26) is strictly positive. Therefore, the payoff is
strictly increasing in the action θsj and grows unbounded. A Nash equilibrium
does not exist.
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2.7.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We break the proof into five steps. First, we show that any Nash equilib-
rium has at least two positive components and we derive the necessary and
sufficient conditions for such equilibrium. Next we establish the existence
and uniqueness of the market allocation at the Nash equilibrium and de-
rive the first-order necessary conditions for (2.12). We show that for the
bids/offers given by (2.2) and (2.3), the equilibrium conditions of all players
become equivalent to the first-order conditions of (2.12). Finally, we establish
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Step 1. (Any Nash Equilibrium Has at Least Two Positive Components)
First, it is straightforward to see that 1ᵀθd + 1ᵀθs = 0 cannot occur at the
Nash equilibrium since κ0|J | > d
0
|I| and therefore the market does not clear.
Next, we consider two cases. First, assume that 1ᵀ θd = 0. Fix supplier j
and let 1ᵀ θs−j = 0. Note that, in this case, θ
s
j > 0 is not possible by the
non-pivotal supplier assumption. A Nash equilibrium cannot exist with all
consumers bidding zero and all but one supplier offering a strictly positive
θsj . Second, assume 1
ᵀ θs = 0. Fix consumer i and let 1ᵀ θd−i = 0. Then,
θdi > 0 implies di > d
0










κ0|J | − d0|I|
θdi − θdi , (2.27)
which is strictly increasing as θdi becomes small and attains its maximum
when θdi = 0. Thus for any θ
d
i > 0 there exists an infinitesimally smaller and
positive θdi that yields higher payoff. Moreover, by definition of Ui(0, 0) =
U(d0i ) = 0. A Nash equilibrium does not exist in this case. Hence, at the Nash




has at least two positive components.
Step 2. (Necessary and Sufficient Nash Equilibrium Conditions) Having
shown that any Nash equilibrium must have at least two positive components,
we only focus in the region where 1ᵀ θd + 1ᵀ θs > 0. Note that, for each
consumer (supplier), their payoff is strictly concave in the action θdi (θ
s
j).
Hence, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient. Moreover, we
must have
0 ≤ θ̂sj ≤ θmaxj :=
κ0j















≥ 0. We have the following equilibrium condi-
tions.
A demand profile θ̂d =
(


































≤ λ(θ̂d, θ̂s), if θ̂di = 0. (2.28b)
A supply profile θ̂s =
(

































≥ λ(θ̂d, θ̂s), if 0 < θ̂sj ≤ θmaxj .
(2.29b)
The equilibrium conditions (2.28) and (2.29) are derived from the KKT
conditions of each player’s payoff maximization problem, where the payoff
of each consumer and supplier is given by expressions (2.10) and (2.11),
respectively.
Step 3. (Existence and Uniqueness of a Market Allocation) Equipped with
the above relations we now proceed to the market manager’s problem. Note
that Ûi(di) is strictly concave and Ĉj(sj) is strictly convex. Hence, Ŵ is
continuous and strictly concave over a compact set. Specifically, the Hessian









< 0, for k = |I|+ 1, . . . , |I|+ |J |,
(2.30)
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and hkm = 0 for k 6= m. Hence, H is negative definite and there exists a
unique solution to (2.12).
Step 4. (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Market Allocation)
Let (d̂, ŝ) be the unique optimal solution to (2.12). There exists Lagrange
multiplier λ such that(
1− d̂i




= λ, if d̂i > d0, (2.31a)(
1− d̂i




≤ λ, if d̂i = d0, (2.31b)(
1 +
ŝj




≥ λ, if 0 ≤ ŝj < κ0j , (2.31c)(
1 +
ŝj




≤ λ, if 0 < ŝj ≤ κ0j . (2.31d)






Note that since there is at least one ŝj > 0 and Ui and Ci are strictly
increasing, then λ > 0. Consider bids θ̂di = λ(d̂i − d0i ) for i ∈ I and offers
θ̂sj = λ(κ
0
j − ŝj) for j ∈ J . Then, θdi ≥ 0 and θsj ≥ 0 for every consumer and
every supplier, respectively. Suppose now that di > d
0
i and dk = d
0
k for all
k 6= i and let sj = κ0j for all j ∈ J . This implies that di = d0i + κ0|J | − d0|I|.
Then from (2.31a) we have λ = 0. However, we have ∂Uk(d
0
k)/∂dk > 0 for
each k 6= i ∈ I, which violates (2.31b). Thus, the vector (θ̂d, θ̂s) cannot have
all components zero except one θdi > 0.
Similarly, (θ̂d, θ̂s) cannot have all components zero except one θsj > 0 for
some firm j ∈ J . This is obvious by Assumption 1 since it holds κ0|J |− κ0j >
d0|I| for every supplier. Hence, at least two components of (θ̂
d, θ̂s) are positive.
Moreover, since ŝj = κ
0
j if and only if θ̂
s





then it is not hard to see that (2.31) become equivalent to (2.28)-(2.29).
Hence, the action vector (θ̂d, θ̂s) is a Nash equilibrium. This also establishes
existence of the Nash equilibrium.
We now reverse the argument. Let (θ̂d, θ̂s) be a Nash equilibrium profile
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satisfying (2.28)-(2.29). Therefore, it has at least two positive components






i ∈ I and the supply allocation ŝj = κ0j − θ̂sj/λ(θ̂d, θ̂s) for j ∈ J . It follows
that (d̂, ŝ) satisfy (2.31) with λ = λ(θ̂d, θ̂s).
Step 5. (Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium) We have shown that all
Nash equilibria yield a unique market allocation. Uniqueness of the Nash





(d, s, λ) is one-to-one.
2.7.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Step 1. (Bounding the Price Markup) To derive the upper bound on the
Lerner index we note that at the Nash equilibrium there exists at least one




< κ0j or θ̂
s















































Utilizing (2.33) and substituting in the expression of LI(θ̂d, θ̂s) yields the
bound in (2.18).
Step 2. (Bounding the Social Welfare) To simplify exposition let x = (d, s).
In this step we aim to bound the social welfare at the Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
29
W(x̂). Specifically,





















































































































Inequality (2.34a) follows from optimality conditions of (2.12) while (2.34c)
from the definitions of Ûk and Ĉk. Inequality (2.34d) follows from concavity





for every k ∈ I and ŝk ≤ κ0k for every k ∈ J . Inequality (2.34f) follows from
concavity of Uk and that
Uk
((


























which implies that Uk(d̂k) & d̂kUk(d?k)/d
?
k. The last inequality follows from
minimizing the expression y2−y+1, which is minimized for y? = 1/2, where
y = d̂k/d
?
k. Finally, note that ζ/(ζ −maxk κ0k) is a decreasing function of ζ.
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Requiring ζ ∈ [4 maxk κ0k,∞) its highest value is 4/3.
2.8 Summary
We studied a market with |J | suppliers and |I| consumers that compete
in supply offers and demand bids for a product. Our analysis showed that
with a specific family of scalar-parameterized offers/bids, the market sup-
ports an efficient competitive equilibrium. Under strategic interactions, we
showed there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and propose an efficient way
of computing the induced market allocation. Moreover, the welfare loss and
the price markups at the Nash equilibrium are bounded. We extended the
two-sided market mechanism in wholesale electricity market models and es-
tablished that it supports efficient market equilibria. The market mechanism
has multiple interesting applications. For example, owing to their simplicity,
scalar-parameterized offers/bids can be effectively utilized to model compe-
tition among retail electricity customers that are becoming both consumers
and producers, due to the proliferation of distributed energy resources. We







The importance of inter-regional markets and coordination among different
SOs is underlined by the wave of geographically disperse renewable gener-
ation. In practice, inter-regional markets involve complex rules and mech-
anisms, often resulting in inefficient power schedules. In this chapter, we
effectively analyze such markets utilizing scalar-parameterized supply offers
and reveal the main factors that drive efficiency in inter-regional markets.
3.1 The Importance of Tie-Lines
Different parts of an interconnected power grid are controlled and managed
by different system operators (SOs). We call the geographical footprint
within each SO’s jurisdiction an area, and transmission lines that intercon-
nect two different areas as tie-lines. Efficient scheduling of power flows over
tie-lines is paramount to improve market efficiency and exploit geographically
diverse renewable resources. Tie-lines are capable of supplying a significant
portion of each area’s electricity demand. For example, the New York ISO
(NYISO) and ISO New England (ISO-NE) share nine tie-lines with approxi-
mately 1800 MW capacity, capable of supplying 12% of New England’s and
10% of New York’s demand as of 2009 [34]. Even though tie-lines are im-
portant assets, they have been historically under-utilized or scheduled in the
counter-economic direction [34]. The economic loss from inefficient tie-line
schedules has been estimated at $784 million between NYISO and ISO-NE
in 2006-10 [34], the burden of which has been ultimately borne by end-use
customers. What causes such inefficiencies? There are a number of factors
that include the inherent uncertainty about power requirements when tie-
lines are scheduled prior to delivery time points, the lack of coordination and
appropriate information exchange among the SOs, ad hoc use of proxy buses
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in deciding the schedule and transaction fees.
Conceptually, power flows over tie-lines should be determined through a
joint economic dispatch problem geared toward maximizing the efficiency
of the interconnected power grid as a whole. However, historical and legal
reasons render such an aggregation of market information from different areas
at a central location untenable. Naturally, a considerable effort has been
made to solve the joint dispatch problem in a distributed fashion, focusing on
primal [35, 36] and dual decomposition methods [37, 38, 39]. In such methods,
SOs exchange information among themselves to compute the optimal tie-
line schedule. This theoretical coordination mechanism, referred to as Tie
Optimization (TO) in [34], proved challenging to implement in practice. It
was perceived as requiring the SOs to trade directly with each other, violating
their financial neutrality, in lieu of the earlier market-based, albeit inefficient,
process for scheduling tie-line flows. Instead, many SOs adopted variants of
Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS), e.g., see [40, 41], that sought
to blend the earlier market-based tie-line scheduling with the theoretically
optimal TO, after receiving approval from FERC.
CTS is a market mechanism in which external market participants submit
bids and offers to import or export from one area to the other. CTS market
design is predicated on the simple premise that arbitrage opportunity will
attract more participants, whose profit motivation will ultimately shrink that
opportunity, pushing the schedule closer to the theoretically optimum. CTS
has certainly improved tie-line scheduling as per [42, 43], but significant inef-
ficiencies remain. Motivated by these inefficiencies, we present a theoretical
model to analyze CTS and investigate the repercussions of strategic behavior
on overall market performance. We provide palpable insights on the conse-
quences of an illiquid market, errors in SOs’ price forecasts and transaction
fees on market efficiency, all of which have been named in [43] as crucial
factors affecting CTS market efficiency.1 In Section 3.2 we introduce the
mechanics of CTS.
1We remark that the use of proxy buses as CTS trading locations results in the so-
called “loop flow” problem (see [44]) that negatively impacts CTS market performance.
We refer the reader to [45] for mechanisms to tackle this problem.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the TO and CTS scheduling mechanisms.
3.2 The CTS Mechanism
CTS is a real-time, market-based mechanism for tie-line scheduling that re-
placed an earlier market-based structure in an effort to streamline the bidding
and scheduling process. Among the important changes, CTS unified the bid
submission and clearing process among the neighboring SOs, reduced the tie-
line schedule duration from one hour to 15-minute intervals, and decreased
time delays among bidding, scheduling, and power delivery. To illustrate the
mechanics and economic rationale of CTS, consider a two-area power system,
shown in Figure 3.1, that share a common interface, with the power flowing
through the interface denoted by Q. Assume the SOs want to determine the
tie-line schedule for an upcoming interval [t, t + 15]. At t − 15, both SOs
compute their supply stacks by solving an area-wise parametric economic
dispatch by varying the amount of power Q flowing on the tie-line. Notice
that there is approximately a 30-minute time delay between when the tie-line
is scheduled and when power delivery takes place.
An example of supply stack is shown in Figure 3.1. The stack of area a
represents the expected incremental dispatch cost of delivering power at its
side of the interface. Similarly, the stack of area b represents the expected
decremental dispatch cost of reduced supply, shown in descending order. In
this example, the direction of power should be from area a to b since at zero
schedule, area b operates at higher costs than area a. At the level where dis-
patch costs at the border become equal or where the supply stacks intersect,
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the tie-line schedule minimizes the aggregate dispatch costs across the two
areas. This schedule, denoted by QTO, corresponds to the outcome of the
theoretical tie optimization (TO) scheme that minimizes the aggregate dis-
patch costs across the two areas. While CTS remains our focus in this thesis,
TO serves as our theoretical benchmark to compare CTS against. Contrary
to TO, CTS relies on virtual traders whose offers/bids are utilized together
with the supply stacks to arrive at the tie-line schedule, as we describe next.
A CTS participant is a virtual bidder that can offer to transport power
across areas without physically consuming or producing it. They only par-
ticipate in the tie-line scheduling process, bearing no obligation for physical
power delivery; the transaction is purely financial. In particular, CTS partic-
ipants submit “interface” bids that consist of three elements: the minimum
price difference the bidder is willing to accept, the maximum quantity to
be transferred, and the direction of trade, i.e., the exporting and importing
area. All the bids indicating a direction from a to b are stacked from lowest
to highest price, to create their own interface supply stack as shown in Figure
3.1. Bids that indicate direction from b to a are rejected at the outset since
they would widen the SO-predicted price spread. The price spread curve is
derived by subtracting the supply stack of area a from that of area b. The
CTS schedule, denoted by QCTS, is set at the intersection of the interface
supply stack and the price spread.2 An interface bid is accepted if its offer
price is less than the price spread at the tie-line schedule. Therefore, all
interface bids to the left of the CTS schedule are accepted; all bids to the
right are not.
CTS bids can be submitted up to t − 75, are cleared at t − 15 and are
settled at the ex-post LMPs calculated for the time period [t, t+ 15]. Hence,
there is approximately a 30-minute latency time for the SOs and 90 minutes
for CTS participants. This latency problem exposes participants to financial
risk since there is uncertainty at which LMPs CTS bids will settle. LMPs
are highly volatile (see Figure II-7 in [34]) and bids that appeared economic
at t − 15 may be uneconomic at t + 15, impacting overall efficiency of CTS
2The intersection of the supply stacks can occur to the right of the total transfer
capability (TTC) of the interface. In such cases, QCTS is equal to TTC, preventing price
convergence. However, according to [34], the primary interface between NYISO–ISO-NE
was congested 0.3% and 1.2% of the hours eastbound and westbound, respectively, in 2009.
In this work, we focus on the factors that cause price separation under CTS, other than
TTC.
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schedules. We emphasize that it may not be possible to eliminate latency
time, irrespective of the scheduling mechanism in place, as this would require
improvements in communication technology and SO commitment systems
that often require look-ahead information. Thus, scheduling inefficiencies
due to time delays will continue to occur under CTS or any other mechanism,
unless bid submittal and market clearing come significantly close to delivery
time.
In the sequel, we extract a theoretical model to study CTS. The purpose
of our model is to serve as a useful tool for analysis and reveal fundamental
design flaws of CTS and similar markets, and not to precisely describe reality.
Despite being a theoretical abstraction, our model reveals a number of factors
that drive CTS efficiency such as market liquidity, behavior of CTS bidders,
transaction fees and SO’s forecast errors.
3.3 Modeling the CTS Market as a Game
The first question we answer is whether the incentives of CTS bidders are
aligned with those of the SOs and CTS design. Given that latency time will
always influence efficiency, let us assume, for the time being, that bid submit-
tal and scheduling times happen near real-time. We relegate the discussion
on latency in Section 3.6. To reveal the impacts of bidding behavior on CTS,
we model CTS as a game among virtual bidders who compete to transport
power over the tie-lines against an elastic inter-area price spread that varies
with Q. For areas a and b, denote by Pa(Q) and Pb(Q), the LMPs at CTS
trading locations, respectively. Without loss of generality, let area a export
and area b import power, and define
P(Q) := Pb(Q)− Pa(Q) (3.1)
as the price spread between the areas.
Assumption 2. P : R→ R is differentiable, concave and strictly decreasing
in Q ≥ 0 with P(0) > 0.
Concavity, differentiability and decreasing nature of P are standard as-
sumptions in prior literature on supply function and Cournot competition
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models, e.g., see [46, 21, 47, 20]. In CTS, the decreasing nature of P re-
sults organically from the fact that price differences decline as the lower-cost
region exports to the higher-cost, displacing expensive generation from the
dispatch solution. However, smoothness of P does not occur in practice. In
the sequel, we argue that Pb(Q) − Pa(Q) does exhibit some affine depen-
dence on Q based on available data. Furthermore, without some theoretical
assumptions, the game-theoretical analysis becomes challenging.
With the previous discussion in mind, consider N virtual bidders in the
CTS market. Let bidder i provide two parameters θi, Bi to the SOs with the
understanding that they are willing to transport up to
xi(p) := Bi −
θi
p
, θi ≥ 0 (3.2)
amount of power from area a to b at a price spread of p > 0. Figure 3.2
reveals how the parameters θi, Bi affect the shape of the transport offer.
Bidder i is willing to transport a maximum quantity of Bi, but at a mini-
mum price spread of θi/Bi. The required price difference increases with the
power transport and grows unbounded as the latter approaches Bi. In ef-
fect, transporting power above Bi requires an infinite price difference. The
parameterized “hockey-stick” shaped transport offer in (3.2) is a smooth ap-
proximation to the one in practice where a player is willing to transport up
to Bi at a specified price difference. Therefore, bidder i expresses their total
budget or their liquidity in Bi. In what follows, we assume that the bid-
der acts strategically in θi, given Bi that models their budget constraints.
The transport offer considered in (3.2) allows market participants to submit
negative quantities. Hence, we restrict θi to satisfy θi ≤ P(0)Bi.
p
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Figure 3.2: Parameterized interface bid of CTS market participant.
Using the family of transport offers in (3.2), the bidders participate in
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a capacitated scalar-parameterized supply function competition against an
elastic demand in (3.1). Given the liquidities B = (B1, . . . , BN), the choice
of bids θ = (θ1, . . . , θN) from the CTS bidders describes their willingness to
transport power across the interface according to (3.2). The SOs calculate
x? := (x?1, . . . , x
?
N) as the allocations of the tie-line flow to the participants
by solving












where 1 denotes a vector of ones of appropriate size. Notice that the trans-
port offer enters the SOs’ problem as the “bid-in cost” of each CTS bidder
to transport quantity xi. With this interpretation, the SOs’ flow allocation
problem in (3.3) seeks to maximize the social welfare of an economy that is
composed of the wholesale markets in areas a and b together with the CTS
bidders (see [45] for a similar interpretation of the CTS market objective).
Observe that the reported transport offer of each participant resembles a
logarithmic barrier function which encodes each participant’s budget con-
straint. Thus, one can drop this constraint for any participant whose bid
satisfies θi > 0.
The CTS schedule occurs where the offer stack for inter-area power trans-





Denote the solution of (3.4) by QCTS(θ; B). Then, the market clearing price
is given by
p(θ; B) = P(QCTS(θ; B)). (3.5)
Let us now define a useful benchmark: the maximum inter-area demand or
QTO. This schedule corresponds to the quantity for which the inter-area price







At QTO there is no more opportunity for arbitrage as P(QTO) = 0. With
this definition in mind, we can now define the CTS flow allocation to every
38
participant as





θ > 0. (3.7)
When 1ᵀ θ = 0, from (3.3) it follows that QCTS = min{1ᵀ B, QTO}. When
1ᵀ B < QTO, x
?
i (0; B) = Bi irrespective of p. On the other hand, if 1
ᵀ B ≥
QTO, then any feasible solution of (3.3) is optimal. In this case, we specify
x?i as the allocation of QTO proportional to each participant’s budget, i.e.,
x?i (0; B) = (Bi/1
ᵀ B)QTO. With these additional conventions, x
?
i is well-
defined for any θ and B.
While virtual bidders do not incur any costs to physically transport power,
many pairs of SOs levy transaction fees on a per-MWh basis, e.g., in CTS
between NYISO and PJM, NYISO charges physical exports to PJM at a
rate ranging from $4-$8 per MWh, while PJM charges physical imports and
exports rates that average less than $3 per MWh. See [43] for details. For
a willingness to transport xi MW of power from area a to b, assume that
transaction cost equals c · xi, where c is measured in $/MWh. Then, each
bidder’s payoff equals the total revenue garnered less the transaction costs,
formally given in
πi(θi,θ−i) = P (QCTS(θ; B))x?i (θ; B)− cx?i (θ; B)
= P (QCTS(θ; B))Bi − θi − cx?i (θ; B), (3.8)
where θ−i denotes a vector with all but the ith component of θ. With this
discussion in mind, we now proceed to define the CTS game. The set of
players consists of N CTS participants. When players incur costs c ≥ 0,
any player bidding θi/Bi ≤ c would incur loss. Thus, it makes sense to re-
strict each player’s action space to the compact set [cBi,P(0)Bi]. Therefore,
Θ =
∏n
i=1[cBi,P(0)Bi] is the strategy space of the game. Define G(B, c)
as the CTS game among N virtual bidders who bid θ ∈ Θ, given B, and
receive a payoff described by (3.8). Bidders selfishly seek to maximize their
own payoffs, given their liquidities. A bid profile θNE constitutes a Nash













for all θi ∈ [cBi,P(0)Bi]. That is, no player has an incentive for a unilateral
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deviation from the equilibrium offer. We establish the existence of such an
equilibrium profile in our first result.
Theorem 4 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium). Let Assumption 2 hold. Then,
the CTS game G(B, c) admits a Nash equilibrium if P satisfies
P ′′(Q)(1ᵀB−Q) ≥ 2P ′(Q). (3.9)
The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Section 3.7. The proof relies on
Rosen’s result in [48] after we establish that G(B, c) is a concave game. Exis-
tence of an equilibrium requires the additional condition on P given by (3.9),
that is satisfied by many commonly used demand function families including
affine models. To explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium we restrict our
attention to affine price spreads
P(Q) := α− βQ (3.10)
with α, β > 0. Therefore, from Theorem 4 we conclude that an equilibrium
always exists for G(B, c, α, β). The price spread can be shown to be affine in
Q, when each area is represented as a copperplate power system, having a
generator with quadratic generation costs and a fixed demand. This follows
from properties of multiparametric quadratic programs in [49, Theorem 7.6].
To further justify our modeling choice, we perform a linear regression of New
England’s LMP at the CTS node (Roseton) as PNE = w1PNY + w2Q + w3,
where PNY is the LMP at New York’s CTS trading node. We obtain w1 ≈ 1.0
with an adjusted R2 coefficient of 0.95, revealing an affine dependency of
PNY − PNE in Q. We obtain similar results when PNY is the dependent
variable and PNE, Q are used as predictors. However, Q alone is not sufficient
to accurately predict price differences between SOs. Spreads are, typically,
noisy data that is influenced by multiple factors such as renewable generation
[50], fuel prices [51], seasonality [52, 53], and so forth. The goal of this
thesis is not to provide an accurate model to forecast inter-area price spreads;
our focus is to reveal market design flaws particularly when participants
are strategic. To this end, an affine model is satisfactory to perform the
game-theoretic analysis. Finally, we remark that while it is challenging to
establish uniqueness of equilibria in the setting of Theorem 4, the same does
not hold with affine demand functions under additional assumptions, as we
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demonstrate next.
3.4 Impact of Liquidity in CTS Markets
Our first goal is to investigate the impacts of liquidity on the CTS scheduling
efficiency. To isolate the effects of liquidity, neglect transaction fees and set









where recall thatW measures the aggregate welfare of the wholesale markets
in the two areas attained at a particular tie-line schedule. TO seeks to
maximize this welfare with QTO = α/β, while the outcome of CTS arises
from the strategic interaction of the market participants.
Our next result characterizes the equilibrium and provides key insights
into the behavior of ηCTS ≤ 1 in different liquidity regimes.
Proposition 1. Consider the CTS game G(B, 0, α, β), where Bm is the
unique maximal budget in {B1, . . . , BN}. Then, G(B, 0, α, β) admits a unique





(β2Bm − P2(1ᵀB)) , if |1ᵀB− α/β| < Bm,
0, otherwise,
(3.11)
and θNEi = 0 for i 6= m. Furthermore, we have
ηCTS(B)

= 1, if 1ᵀB− α/β ≥ Bm,
≥ 3
4
, if |1ᵀB− α/β| < Bm
= 2z − z2, otherwise
, (3.12)
where z := β
α
1ᵀB.
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Section 3.7. The result high-
lights that allocation and efficiency vary widely with liquidity and the player
with the maximal liquidity plays a rather central role in determining the out-
come of the CTS market. To offer more insights, distinguish three different
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.3: Plots (a), (b) and (c) show payoffs of a 3-player CTS game
G(B, 0, α, β) in the high, intermediate and low liquidity regimes, respectively.
The liquidities satisfy B1 < B2 < B3.
liquidity regimes. Identify the liquidity as high when 1ᵀ B − α/β ≥ Bm,
where the aggregate liquidity of all players but m is sufficient to cover the
efficient schedule QTO = α/β. The intermediate liquidity occurs where
the aggregate liquidity is different from QTO by at most the liquidity of
player m, i.e., |1ᵀB− α/β| < Bm. Finally, the low liquidity regime is where
1ᵀB +Bm < QTO. The outcome and the efficiency differ substantially across
these regimes.









NE; B) = Bi, i 6= m,
where B−m denotes the vector of liquidities of all players, except m. Thus,
all but player m offer their maximum liquidity at equilibrium. These players
benefit from being inframarginal, exploiting the bid of the marginal player m.
This behavior is reminiscent of the so-called “free-rider problem” (see [54]).
When the liquidity is too high or too low, player m does not have enough
market power and does not benefit from bidding nonzero θm, implying that
they do not withhold from their maximal budget Bm in their transport offer.
In the intermediate liquidity case, player m enjoys market power and their
flow allocation can be shown to be the Cournot best response to this residual
price spread P(Q− 1ᵀB−m).
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ᵀB−m) , if |1ᵀB− α/β| < Bm,
1ᵀB, otherwise.
When liquidity is high, QCTS coincides with QTO, implying that CTS yields
the SOs’ intended outcome. In other words, perfect competition arises as a
result of strategic incentives. In the intermediate liquidity regime, CTS suf-
fers welfare loss due to strategic interaction. The loss, however, is bounded;
strategic behavior cannot cripple the welfare under perfect competition by
more than 25%. When the liquidity is low, the lower bound on ηCTS can
be arbitrarily small. However, in this case, lack of efficiency is not due to
strategic interactions but rather due to the lack of market liquidity.
3.4.1 Strategic Selection of Budgets
To offer further insights in the previous discussion, consider an example of a
CTS game with three players. The players’ payoffs are shown in Figure 3.3 for
each liquidity regime. When liquidity is high, all players garner zero payoffs
by bidding θNE. Any other action, induces negative reward and CTS yields
the efficient schedule. Notice how the payoff of maximal player (B3) changes
in the intermediate regime, which leads to her choosing θNEm > 0. This results
in efficiency loss of CTS. Interestingly, the maximum payoff for all players
(and highest efficiency loss for CTS) is attained at the low liquidity regime,
which can result either from a small number of players or small budgets.
This outcome is problematic from a market design perspective: it incentivizes
players’ to misrepresent Bi’s.
Indeed, if players are aware that reporting lowerBi’s increases their payoffs,
strategic behavior would lead to even greater efficiency loss. To see why,
consider the case where players, prior to choosing θi’s, strategically select
their budgets. The selection of budgets is such that no player would prefer
to be in the high or intermediate liquidity regimes. To maximize their payoffs,
players would have to select Bi’s such that 1
ᵀB+Bm < QTO. In this regime,
the outcome of game in θ is fully characterized from 1. Hence, at the stage
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of selecting Bi’s, player i faces payoff
πi(Bi,B−i) = P(θNE; B)x?i (θNE; B)− γiBi
= (α− β1ᵀB)Bi − γiBi, (3.13)
where γi > 0 represents return on investment of a risk-free asset. Then,








, i = 1, . . . , N, (3.14)
which is the Cournot best response of player i to the budgets of all other







for every CTS player i. It is straightforward to verify that the budgets
computed by (3.15) satisfy the requirement 1ᵀ B? + B?m < α/β, for any








which approaches QTO as N → ∞. The previous discussion draws interest-
ing parallels with earlier works that have established that quantity/capacity
precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes [55, 56].
Notice that if players are strategic only in θ, then N = 2 would suffice to
restore competition, provided sufficient liquidity. However, if CTS bidders
were to strategically select Bi’s prior to bidding in the market, then N = 2
would no longer suffice to yield the efficient schedule. The previous discus-
sion reveals that supply function competition in scalar-parameterized offers,
behaves as Bertrand competition in θ and as Cournot competition in B.
Constructing the more general framework to establish the conditions under
which the previous equivalence holds, is an interesting direction for future
research.
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3.4.2 Learning Equilibria Through Repeated Play
Nash equilibria characterize how the incentives of market participants are ori-
ented. However, the power of said equilibria to predict market outcomes may
appear limited in that players are endowed with intelligence over their oppo-
nents’ payoff and the system conditions to compute such an equilibrium. In
practice, players interact repeatedly exploring the market environment while
facing a noisy reward. Motivated to investigate if players can learn equilibria
through repeated play, we study the game dynamics where bidders adopt
action-value methods [57] to update their bids. More precisely, we imple-
ment an upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithm for each bidder. In such
a setting, each player is agnostic to the presence of other players and the SOs’
clearing process, i.e., they endogenize these as part of the environment that
yields a random reward. UCB is a popular reinforcement learning algorithm
that achieves logarithmic regret [58, 59] in static environments and balances
between exploration and exploitation. In each round (an instance of a CTS
market), each player selects the action that has the maximum observed payoff
thus far plus some exploration bonus.
The game proceeds as follows: at each round, each bidder chooses θ from
a finite set of actions Θ := {θ1, . . . , θM}. Each bidder maintains a vector
R ∈ RM of average rewards from each action and the number of times
T ∈ NM each action is chosen, where N denotes the set of naturals. Here,
the reward equals the revenue less the transaction cost from the CTS market.
Bidders initialize R by selecting every action (possible bid from Θ) at least
once. Upon bidding θk ∈ Θ at a certain round, say she receives the reward
rk from the CTS market. Then, the bidder updates T k and Rk as















The parameter ρ > 0 controls the degree of exploration. The larger the ρ,
the player is eager to explore actions that have not been tried often enough.
The smaller the ρ, the player tends to choose an action largely based on the
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(a) Intermediate liquidity (b) High liquidity
Figure 3.4: Plot of cumulative percentage of times the Nash action is chosen
across 3000 games for bidders 1 ( ) and 5 ( ). Bidder 5 is marginal
for (a) and inframarginal for (b). After 3000 games, bidders 1-5 respectively
select θNE in (99.9, 92.1, 99.9, 99.6, 99.2)% games in (a) and (90.1, 99.9, 86.4,
92.4, 88.2)% games in (b).
(a) Tie-line schedules (b) Price spread
Figure 3.5: Comparison of tie-line schedules and price spreads for a highly
( ) and intermediately liquid ( ) CTS market.
average reward seen thus far.
We utilize historical CTS data from the NYISO and ISONE markets to
compute the affine price spread that yields QTO = 1493 MW. We con-
sider repeated play of the CTS game with five participants, first with B =
(298, 223, 194, 149, 893) and then with B = (596, 522, 640, 373, 893). The
first example corresponds to an intermediate liquidity regime with θNE =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 4882). The second example belongs to the high liquidity category
for which θNE = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). In our simulations, we use ρ = 2 following
[57, Chapter 2]. Each CTS bidder chooses from ten θ’s in Θ = [0, 6000] that
includes the optimal actions. Figure 3.4 shows percentages of optimal actions
selected by bidders in a total of 3000 games for the high and intermediate
liquidity regimes.
In the intermediate regime, the pivotal and inframarginal players act in
a rather “greedy” fashion, exploiting their optimal action north of 99% of
the games. This implies that the observed reward from playing the optimal
action is large enough, even as the exploration bonus of other actions in-
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creases. Bidder 5 loses their role as the marginal player when the liquidity
is high. In this regime, players are slower to discover their optimal actions,
although selection percentages are north of 88% of the games. Our numerical
experiments clearly demonstrate that even in a setting where players know
little to nothing about the game setting, they are able to discover and play
equilibrium actions (in majority of the games) through repeated play. This
experiment lends credence to the conclusions from our equilibrium analysis.
Indeed, QCTS/QTO in Figure 3.5 remains close to unity and price spreads are
below $2/MWh in most games for a highly liquid CTS market. A liquidity re-
duction of around 40% has palpable effects on market performance, although
in aggregate, the players have the capacity to meet QTO. In particular, the
price spread for intermediate liquidity is more than $6/MWh higher than the
highly liquid case and QCTS/QTO remains well below 80%. This experiment
highlights how rise of pivotal players exercising market power exploiting the
lack of liquidity can impact market performance.
3.5 Interactions with Virtual Trading in Energy
Markets
CTS performance can be influenced by uneconomic bidding that aims to
benefit financial positions of virtual transactions in energy markets. An
example of said transactions are up-to-congestion (UTC) virtual bids [60].
A UTC is a bid in the day-ahead market to purchase congestion and losses
between two nodes within each area. The UTC bid consists of a specified
source and sink location together with a price spread that identifies how much
the participant is willing to pay for congestion and losses between source and
sink. The payoff of a UTC bid depends on the real-time and day-ahead prices
at the specified locations.
Bidding behavior in CTS markets impacts CTS outcomes, that in turn
affect price movements in both areas. Said price movements influence the
return from UTC positions. Thus, bidders with existing UTC portfolios can
engage in uneconomic bidding behavior. Here, we utilize our game model
to illustrate one such case, where UTC positions negatively impact CTS
performance. We remark that price manipulation via uneconomic virtual
transactions has emerged as a central policy concern for FERC; several high-
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profile enforcement cases have ended in multi-million dollar settlements [61].
Denote by fki , the UTC megawatt position of CTS bidder i from an internal
node k inside area b to the CTS trading location. Let Pkb denote the LMP at
node k in area b. Denote by Pk,DAb and PDAb the day-ahead prices at internal
node k and CTS trading location, respectively. Then, the payoff of bidder i
from their UTC positions is given by∑
k
[
(Pb − Pkb )− (PDAb − Pk,DAb )
]
fki , (3.19)
where the sum is taken with k ranging over buses within area b. The CTS
outcome will not affect day-ahead prices, but it does influence real-time prices
at other locations inside each area. We have assumed so far that Pb − Pa
has an affine dependence on Q, the amount that flows from bus a to bus b.
Assume a similar affine dependence
Pb(Q)− Pkb (Q) = αkin − βkinQ
between the CTS trading location and an internal node k in area b. Albeit
simplistic, this model is enough to reveal the impact of UTCs on CTS mar-
kets. To illustrate the coupling between UTC positions and CTS market,
consider the joint payoff from them for bidder i in






in − βkinQ)fki − (PDAb − Pk,DAb )fki︸ ︷︷ ︸
from UTC
, (3.20)
where Q depends on CTS market clearing with bids θ and liquidities B.
Formally, call this game GUTC (B, c, α, β, f , αin, βin) with payoffs in (3.20).
Here, αin, βin, f collect the respective variables across all internal buses. Our
next result characterizes the market outcome with UTC positions.
Proposition 2. The game GUTC (B, 0, α, β, f , αin, βin) admits a unique Nash
equilibrium if f is elementwise non-negative, for which the tie-line schedule
48











, if |1ᵀB− α/β| < B̃m,
1ᵀB, otherwise,






i for i = 1, . . . , N and m is the only player with
maximal B̃m.
The proof of Proposition 2 is provided in Section 3.7. The result reveals
that the bidder with maximum combined CTS and UTC position emerges
as the pivotal player in this market. Moreover, B̃m ≥ Bm dictates that less
power is scheduled to flow in the tie-line when bidders have such positions.
This results from the incentives of the pivotal player who benefits from higher
prices at the importing region b’s CTS bus as that yields a higher UTC payoff.
In fact, the difference in the tie-line schedules with and without UTC, grows
with B̃m −Bm that is directly proportional to the UTC positions. Opposite
conclusions can be drawn if we consider players with UTC positions that
source at area b’s proxy bus.
The following example illustrates the shift in market power and scheduling
efficiency when participants hold UTCs. Consider the CTS market in Section
3.4.2 where the fifth bidder is pivotal in the intermediate liquidity regime.
At the equilibrium, QCTS = 1176 MW. Assume that the first bidder holds a
UTC f1 = 800 MW to an internal bus for which αin = 35.7 and βin = 0.02.
Then, B̃ = [1018, 463, 193, 149, 893]. Notice that bidder one emerges as the
new marginal bidder and has incentive to bid in a way that leads to less
power being scheduled to flow into area b. Indeed, the new tie-line schedule
is QCTS = 1113 MW, 63 MW less than CTS without UTCs, falling even
shorter of QTO = 1493 MW.
3.6 Impact of Forecast Errors and Transaction Costs
Our analysis of the CTS game so far has assumed that players and the SOs
have perfect forecasts into the price spread function. In practice, tie-line
scheduling takes place with a lead time to power delivery, meaning that
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there is an inherent uncertainty in the price spread when these markets are
convened. To model this uncertainty, assume that the SOs conjecture an
affine price spread function
PSO(Q) = αSO − βSOQ
with αSO, βSO > 0. The SOs use this spread to clear the CTS market as in
(3.3). Let the realized price difference be
P?(Q) = α? − β?Q
with α?, β? > 0. Then, the TO schedule and the optimal tie-line schedule,
respectively, are given by
QTO = αSO/βSO and Q? = α?/β?.
Modeling the uncertainty explicitly at the time of scheduling reveals that QTO
may not equal Q?, the ex-post optimal tie-line schedule. Our interest lies in
analyzing if strategic behavior of bidders in the CTS market can correct the
errors in SOs’ forecasts. Do bidders draw the outcome closer to Q? than QTO
or do they drive it further away as a result of their strategic interaction? We
answer this question through a game-theoretic study. We also derive insights
into how nonzero transaction fees (c > 0) affect these conclusions.
To isolate the impacts of uncertainty and transaction fees, we analyze the
game under a simpler setting where the bidders are homogeneous, each with
liquidity B > 0 and conjectured price spread P(Q) = α− βQ with α, β > 0.
Notice that bidders’ conjectured optimal schedule α/β may be different from
both QTO and Q?. We assume here that players share a common belief
that the market operates at an intermediate liquidity where the aggregate
liquidity NB is close to their conjectured optimal tie-line schedule α/β, i.e.,
NB = α/β +O(1/N). (3.21)
Under such an assumption, bidder i conjectures the market price from bid-
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ding θ with liquidities B = B1 to be











which yields the following perceived payoff for bidder i.













Call the CTS game with conjectured price spreads Gconj(B, c, α, β, αSO, βSO),
where α, β satisfy (3.21) and the payoffs are given by (3.22). Assuming that
all players offer based on an equilibrium profile for this game, the SOs then
solve the CTS flow allocation problem in (3.3) with PSO to ultimately com-
pute the tie-line schedule. Our next result characterizes both a (symmetric)
equilibrium profile and the resulting tie-line schedule.
Proposition 3. The CTS game Gconj(B, c, α, β, αSO, βSO) admits a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium given by θNEi =
γ2
4Nβ
for i = 1, . . . , N , for which










where γ := c(2− 1/N) + βB.
The proof of Proposition 3 is provided in Section 3.7. Notice that players
bid solely based on their own conjectures. The tie-line schedule, however,
depends on the conjectures of both the bidders and the SOs. This result will
allow us to study the effect of price spread forecasts and transaction costs on
the scheduling efficiency in the sequel.
The lack of knowledge of Q? by the SOs and market participants prompts
us to investigate whether CTS can yield a more efficient schedule than the
pure SO-driven TO. Proposition 3 implies QCTS ≤ QTO, meaning that CTS
cannot yield a more efficient schedule than TO if QTO < Q?. Hence, CTS
51
can only outperform TO when the SOs’ forecast overestimates QTO. In this
regime, Figure 3.1 yields that QCTS is always closer to Q? when Q? ≤ QTO/2.
Outside of this setting, the outcome of CTS depends on the liquidity and
conjectures of players. Specifically, if NB ∈ A1 ∪ A2, defined in Figure 3.6,
QCTS is closer to Q? than QTO, if
γ2
ββSO
≤ 8 (QTO −Q?) (QTO − 2Q? +NB) . (3.23)
Such a premise appears to run counter to the intuition that TO is optimal.
This situation can only arise under uncertainty where SOs make serious fore-
cast errors in the expected price spread. Surprisingly, forecast errors are
not that rare, according to [43], where the error in SOs’ point forecast for
the price spread between NYISO and ISO-NE averaged $2.42/MWh. Notice
how, in this liquidity regime, the presence of transaction fees makes it harder
to satisfy (3.23). This is intuitively correct since transaction fees drive the
tie-line schedule toward smaller values, as established in Proposition 3.
Figure 3.6: Ability of market participants to correct SO’s forecast error de-
pends on liquidity and transactions costs.
When NB ∈ A3 ∪ A4, liquidity is sufficiently high and the presence of
costs might improve scheduling efficiency since players bid higher prices to
counter costs. Overall, players ability to correct SOs’ forecast is somewhat
limited and relies on many qualifications, indicating that the SOs forecasts
and systematic bias plays a vital role in scheduling efficiency. Moving bid
submittal and clearing timelines closer to power delivery should improve the
efficiency of CTS.
Proposition 3 suggests that incentives of CTS bidders are aligned in a way
that allows them to correct SOs’ forecast errors in some settings. Can players
learn such equilibria through repeated play? We employ the learning frame-
work in Section 3.4.2, where players have their bids cleared against (αSO, βSO)
that are perturbed from (α?, β?) learned from historical data. That is, in ev-
ery round, bidders receive reward from the ex-post price spread described by
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Figure 3.7: The trajectory of CTS schedules cleared against SO’s forecasted
prices with 10% error with c = 0 and c = $8/MWh.
P?. The trajectory of tie-line schedules in Figure 3.7 with c = 0 reveals that
bidding behavior of players results in CTS schedules consistently closer to
the ex-post optimal than TO. Despite the persistent forecast error, bidders
correct the tie-line schedule to an extent by seeking actions that maximize
their observed reward.
The relation in (3.23) reveals that presence of nonzero transaction fees c
make it more difficult for CTS market to drive the outcome closer to the
ex-post optimal as γ increases with c. Bidders reacting to observed rewards
with c = $8/MWh in Figure 3.7 yield a CTS schedule farther from Q?,
seeking actions that yield higher prices but smaller schedules. This result
corroborates our theoretical finding that transaction fees impede bidders’
ability to correct SOs’ forecast errors.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.8: Plot (a) depicts the time series of spread between NYISO and
PJM proxy buses in 2018 (absolute mean = 8.92 $/MWh, std. deviation =
22.11 $/MWh). Plot (b) shows the same between NYISO and ISO-NE for
the same year (mean = 0.44, absolute mean = 5.59 $/MWh, std. dev. =
18.14 $/MWh).
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Notice that equilibrium bid grows with c, per Proposition 3. With c >
0, bidders are reluctant to offer their entire liquidity. This prevents the
price spread from converging to zero, even if the market is liquid. Moreover,
transaction fees make it less attractive for CTS bidders overall, hurting long-
term liquidity of the CTS market. Figure 3.8a indicates that the price spread
in the CTS market between NYISO and PJM exhibits longer excursions
from zero and higher volatility compared to that between NYISO and ISO-
NE, depicted in Figure 3.8b. The average absolute spread between NYISO
and PJM is approximately $3.3/MWh higher than that between NYISO and
ISO-NE. We surmise that transaction fees between NYISO and PJM and
the lack thereof between NYISO and ISO-NE are largely responsible for this
difference.
3.7 Proofs
3.7.1 Proof of Theorem 4
We break the proof into two parts—for c > 0 and c = 0. We argue that
G(B, c) is a concave game with a compact strategy set Θ in each case. Then,
the rest follows from Rosen’s result in [48, Theorem 1].
Case with c > 0: Notice that 1ᵀθ > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. The objective function
of (3.3) can be shown to be strictly concave for all θ 6= 0 (the Hessian is
negative definite), meaning that if a solution to the maximization problem
exists, then it is unique. The first-order optimality conditions of (3.3) yield
that such an optimal allocation x? must satisfy
P(1ᵀx?)− θi
Bi − x?i
= 0, ∀i. (3.24)





Since P is strictly decreasing with P(0) > 0, the strictly increasing function
of QCTS that grows to ∞ at 1ᵀB in the RHS of (3.25) must intersect P at a
unique point. Thus, QCTS is uniquely defined for each θ ∈ Θ, and so is x?
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identified by






To establish that G(B, c) is a concave game, we now establish that the payoffs
π(θi,θ−i) in (3.8) are continuous is θ and concave in θi. Notice that the
unique optimal allocation x? is continuous in θ, owing to Berge’s maximum
theorem [62], implying the same for QCTS. In turn, that proves the continuity
of πi in θ. Next, we prove that πi is concave in θi, by showing that P(QCTS)
is concave and x?i is convex in θi.














Since P is concave and strictly decreasing, it suffices to show that QCTS is
convex in θi to conclude that
∂2
∂θ2i
P(QCTS) ≤ 0 and hence, P(QCTS) is concave
in θi.






Now, g(0) > 0 and g is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of its
argument. Also, g is convex because
g′′(QCTS) = P ′′(QCTS)(1ᵀB−QCTS)− 2P ′(QCTS) ≥ 0, (3.28)
where the inequality follows from (3.9), the strictly decreasing and concave
nature of P , and the non-negativity of 1ᵀB−QCTS. These derivatives exist,
owing to the implicit function theorem [63]. Then, QCTS is the inverse of a
decreasing convex function, and is therefore decreasing convex itself in 1ᵀθ,
and therefore in θi. This completes the proof of the concavity of P(QCTS).
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Again, the implicit function theorem guarantees that these derivatives ex-
ist for θ away from the origin. The last term in (3.30) is non-negative by

















where the inequality follows from the fact that P ′(QCTS)(1ᵀB−QCTS) < 0.
This finishes the proof of πi being concave in θi.
Case with c = 0: The payoff πi is continuous in θ and concave in θi for all
θ > 0. We extend the same to θ = 0 with c = 0. With zero costs, we have
πi(θi,θ−i) = P(QCTS(θ; B))Bi − θi. (3.31)
It suffices to argue that QCTS is continuous at θ = 0. Recall that for 1
ᵀθ > 0,






First, assume that 1ᵀB < QTO. Then, P(QCTS) ≥ P(1ᵀB) > 0 since P is
strictly decreasing. Consider a sequence θk → 0 as k →∞. Then, the LHS
of (3.32) vanishes. Therefore, the RHS must vanish as well. Since P does
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not vanish, we must have QCTS(θk) → 1ᵀ B = QCTS(0) as required. Now,
consider the situation where 1ᵀB > QTO. In this case, QCTS ≤ QTO < 1ᵀB.
Consider the sequence θk → 0 as k → ∞. As the LHS of (3.32) vanishes,
P must vanish in the RHS. Therefore, P(QCTS(θk)) → 0 or QCTS(θk) →
P−1(0) = QTO = QCTS(0), as required for the case with 1ᵀ B > QTO. The
case with 1ᵀ B = QTO is trivially satisfied by the same line of arguments.
Hence, QCTS(θ; B) is continuous in θ at the origin. This completes the proof.
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Existence of the Nash equilibrium follows from Theorem 4. Solving (3.3) we


















The payoff for player i is given by









The payoff is continuous in θ−i and strictly concave in θi. The strategy
space of each player is [0, αBi]. A bid profile θ
NE =
(















≥ 0, if 0 < θNEi ≤ αBi, (3.35b)







From (3.36) we deduce that the payoff derivative cannot vanish for more
than one player. Moreover, no player would bid θNEi = αBi since that yields
negative payoff and each player profitably deviates by infinitesimally decreas-
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, i 6= m (3.37)
we conclude that θNE−m = 0. In search for positive θm > 0 we find that





• Otherwise, θNEm = 0 since (3.38) yields a negative value.
To prove the bounds on ηCTS(B) first note that the social welfare attains its





Hence, in the high liquidity regime, i.e., 1ᵀB−Bm ≥ α/β, QCTS = QTO and

































































= 2z − z2.
(3.41)
This completes the proof.
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3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
It is easy to verify that (3.20) is concave in θi for fixed θ−i and f non-
negative. Moreover, Q is strictly decreasing in θi and as θi grows large the
price spreads approach the limiting values α and αk. Hence, in (3.20) the
first two terms converge to constant values with the affine term approaching
negative infinity as θi grows unbounded. Therefore, there exists θ
max
i such
that (3.20) becomes negative for θi ≥ θmaxi . As such, we restrict our attention
for a Nash equilibrium within the compact interval [0, θmaxi ]. Existence of a
Nash equilibrium for GUTC
(
B̃, 0, α, β, αk, βk
)
is established by invoking [48,
Theorem 1]. A bid profile θNE =
(




is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if (3.35) are satisfied where πi is replaced with π̃i and αBi with θ
max
i .



















The rest of proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.
3.7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We are in search for a symmetric equilibrium for Gconj(B, c, α, β, αSO, βSO).











2p (θ, B1) 1ᵀθ
]
, (3.43)
where p (θ, B1) =
√















































(αSO − βSONB)2 + 4βSO1ᵀθ. (3.47)
Substituting (3.46) in (3.47) we obtain the expression in Proposition 3.
3.8 Summary
We presented theoretical framework to model CTS as a game among arbi-
trage bidders who compete through scalar-parameterized transport offers.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that provides a concrete
mathematical formulation to model CTS as a game. We established the exis-
tence of Nash equilibria for this game and study the impact of various factors
on the nature of said equilibria to offer insights into the CTS market. We
showed that when transaction costs (levied on a per-megawatt hour basis on
bidders) are absent, then a highly liquid CTS market is efficient. Market effi-
ciency degrades with liquidity shortfall, exhibiting bounded efficiency loss for
intermediate liquidity and unbounded losses in low liquidity regimes. Second,
with transaction costs, CTS fails to eradicate the price spread between ad-
jacent markets even with a liquid market, implying that such costs undercut
the vision behind the market design. Third, we showed that SOs’ estimate
of the price spread plays a central role in the efficiency of CTS markets in
that bidders have limited ability to correct the effects of SOs’ forecast errors.
Fourth, portfolios of virtual trasactions such as up-to-congestion (UTC) bids
held by CTS bidders can impact CTS market outcomes, revealing the de-
pendency of efficiency of these inter-area markets on other energy markets.
Our equilibrium analysis reveals how the strategic incentives in CTS markets
are oriented but does not illustrate if bidders can learn equilibrium behavior
through repeated participation in these markets. We simulate repeated play
using historical data from the NYISO–ISO-NE market. In particular, we
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allow bidders to update their bids through a well-known upper confidence
bound (UCB) algorithm that has been very well studied in the reinforce-
ment learning literature. Our simulations confirm that our conclusions from






The design of participation mechanisms for electricity markets must take
into consideration the aspects of the physical grid that determine the fea-
sible power flows across the system. In Section ?? we adopted a convex
model based on a lossless, linearized power flow model and derived prices for
electricity based from the optimal dual multipliers of nodal power balance
constraints. However, this model ignores key properties of the power system
such as commitment decisions and non-convexities arising from the AC power
flow model. In this chapter, we study price formation for electricity markets
under a non-convex power flow model, which has received less consideration.
4.1 Sources of Non-Convexities
The core dispatch model in organized wholesale electricity markets relies
on a bid-based, security-constrained problem with a linearized power flow
model. LMPs stand on sound economic principles when the market-clearing
problem is convex. Derived as the optimal dual multipliers from the popular
DC approximation dispatch [64], LMPs exhibit several desirable properties.
For example, they adequately incentivize market participants to follow the
dispatch prescribed by the SO. Moreover, the SO never runs cash-negative
after settling the payments with the market participants. See [65, 66] for
details.
The core model for settlement design via LMPs ignores key properties
of the power system. For example, using only the LMP, a generation unit
may not be able to recover its as-bid cost including no-load and startup
costs. Incorporation of unit commitment decisions render the market clearing
problem non-convex. In this case, there may not exist a set of nodally uniform
prices that support a market equilibrium, leading to revenue shortages for
62
generation units that subsequently require out-of-market payments for them
to follow the SO-prescribed dispatch. A long literature has emerged already
to tackle non-convexities from unit commitment considerations, e.g., see [67,
68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. Unfortunately, such considerations do not define the only
source of non-convexity in electricity pricing.
In this thesis, we focus on price formation in electricity markets with non-
convexities in the market clearing problem that arise from an AC power flow
model. Opposed to commitment considerations, this non-convexity is not a
consequence of the cost structures of assets, but rather stems from the nature
of the Kirchhoff’s laws that govern the underlying power network. There
is an increasing interest in the power industry to efficiently and optimally
solve the non-convex market clearing problem with AC power flow, e.g., see
recent efforts under the ongoing ARPA-E GO competition. As pricing under
AC power flow models is gaining traction [73], we are motivated to design
and analyze meaningful prices that can accompany such a dispatch. To
that end, we formulate the economic dispatch problem with AC power flow
equations and derive electricity prices from optimal dual multipliers of its
convex semidefinite relaxation.
Linearized (real) power flow models such as DC approximations or lo-
cal linearizations around an operating point have long been used to design
prices in market environments. Some of these models ignore losses and reac-
tive power considerations, making the settlement design somewhat divorced
from the physics of the power grid. Ad hoc measures to incorporate losses
are known to distort price signals, e.g., see [74]. The motivation behind
explicitly incorporating reactive power in the pricing model is justified by
two major trends. Declining natural gas prices and environmental regula-
tions have caused baseload generation units that have historically provided
reactive power support (e.g. coal plants) to run at economic loss or even
plan retirement. Second, the deepening penetration of distributed genera-
tion has increased focus on ensuring reactive power capability exists given
that high solar generation requires more reactive power. These trends—which
are likely to continue—have resulted in substantial out-of-market payments
in energy uplift, e.g. PJM paid $199 million in 2018 according to [75]. As
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) focuses on price for-
mation and reactive power compensation in the era of increasing renewable
generation [76], the need to incorporate reactive power as an explicit product
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with transparent price signals becomes compelling. By nature, our convex
relaxation-based locational marginal prices (RLMPs) can accommodate AC
power flow models in their full generality. As such, RLMPs assign prices to
both real and reactive power, bringing reactive power compensation into the
fold of competitive markets.
Semidefinite programming (SDP) based convex relaxation of economic dis-
patch problems has its origins in [77]. Popularized by [78], it has been ana-
lyzed in great detail in [79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84], among others. In this thesis, we
focus on RLMPs derived from this SDP relaxation. Moreover, we show that
RLMPs exhibit properties of LMPs when the duality gap of the non-convex
economic dispatch problem vanishes. Specifically, they incentivize market
participants to follow the SO prescribed dispatch and the SO remains sol-
vent after settling payments with the participants (under mild conditions).
When the aforementioned duality gap is nonzero, the absence of a market
equilibrium may provide incentives for certain generators to deviate from
the SO prescribed dispatch signal. In such an event, side payments become
necessary, which are undesirable for a number a reasons as highlighted in
a recent order by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) [85].
We prove that RLMPs minimize a specific form of side payments necessary
to provide dispatch-following incentives to market participants. These side
payments are the sum of the lost opportunity cost for the generators and
the product revenue shortfall, which arise due to network constraints. This
result bears a striking resemblance to the properties of convex hull pricing
(CHPs) that have been proposed and analyzed in [72, 86, 70] to tackle non-
convexity due to commitment decisions. RLMPs, on the other hand, handle
the non-convexity that arises due to power flow equations.
4.2 The Non-Convex Electricity Market Model
Consider an electric power network on n buses and m transmission lines. Let
V ∈ Cn denote the vector of nodal voltage phasors, where C is the set of
complex numbers. Denote by yk`, the admittance of the line joining buses k
and `.
The current flowing from bus k toward an adjacent bus ` is given by
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(Vk − V`)yk`, yielding
pk` + iqk` = Vk(Vk − V`)HyHk` (4.1)
as the apparent power flow from bus k to bus `. The notation uH stands
for the conjugate transpose of u and i :=
√
−1. More succinctly, the above
relation can be written as
pk` + iqk` = V
HΦk`V + iV
HΨk`V, (4.2)




















The two summands in the right-hand side (RHS) of (4.2) define the real
and reactive power flows from bus k to bus `, respectively. Assume that the
real power flows on the lines are constrained as
pkl ≤ fk` (4.3)
for a flow limit fk` > 0. Such limits typically arise from thermal considera-
tions, but may also serve as proxies for stability constraints.1 Assume that
ykk is the shunt admittance at bus k. Then, the apparent power injection at
bus k becomes








= VHΦkV + iV
HΨkV,
1Line flow constraints are often formulated over the apparent power flow as p2k` +
q2k` ≤ f2k`. These alternate formulations ultimately seek to constrain the magnitude of the
current flowing over the transmission line. The formulation in (4.3) can alternately encode





























and 1k ∈ Cn is the vector of all zeros, except the k-th entry that is unity.
The notation ` ∼ k indicates that a transmission line connects buses ` and
k in the power network. Voltage magnitudes across the network are deemed
to remain close to rated voltage levels. We model such constraints at each
bus k as vk ≤ |Vk| ≤ vk that is equivalent to
v2k ≤ VH1k1HkV ≤ v2k. (4.4)
Consider two assets connected at each bus – an uncontrollable asset whose
apparent power draw is fixed and known and a controllable asset whose
power injection can vary within known capacity limits. Let pDk and q
D
k ,
respectively, denote the nominal real and reactive power draws at bus k
from the uncontrollable asset. Similarly, let pGk and q
G
k denote the real and
reactive power generation at bus k, respectively, that vary within known
capacity limits as pGk ∈ [pk, pk] and q
G
k ∈ [qk, qk]. Associated with that




k ). Assume henceforth that ck is
jointly convex in its arguments. Such costs in wholesale markets are inferred
from supply offers and demand bids. Uncontrollable assets represent the
collective inelastic power demands at a bus. Generators and proxy demand
resources comprise controllable assets. There may be one, more than one,
or no controllable and uncontrollable assets at each bus, but we assume one
asset of each kind to simplify notation.
The SO seeks to compute a dispatch that minimizes the aggregate dispatch
costs from the collection of grid-connected controllable assets and meets the
power requirements of the uncontrollable ones, meeting the engineering con-
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subject to pGk − pDk = VHΦkV, (4.5a)
qGk − qDk = VHΨkV, (4.5b)
VHΦk`V ≤ fk`, (4.5c)
p
k
≤ pGk ≤ pk, qk ≤ q
G
k ≤ qk, (4.5d)
v2k ≤ VH1k1HkV ≤ v2k (4.5e)
for k = 1, . . . , n, ` ∼ k
over the variables pG,qG and V. The boldfaced symbols collect the corre-
sponding variables across the network. In PAC, (4.5a) and (4.5b) enforce the
power balance at each bus, (4.5c) limits the power flows over each transmis-
sion line, (4.5d) defines capacity limits for the power production from dis-
patchable assets, and finally, (4.5e) defines bounds on voltage magnitudes.
The above market clearing problem is an instance of an optimal power flow
(OPF) problem with AC power flow. PAC is nonconvex, owing to quadratic
equalities. In Section 4.3 we ask: how should we price such a dispatch?
4.3 Relaxation-Based Locational Marginal Prices
We associate nodal prices to real and reactive powers based on a semidefinite
programming (SDP) based convex relaxation of PAC in PSDP in (4.6) that
seeks to optimize the same objective function as PAC, but over a convex
superset of the feasible set of PAC. To arrive at the relaxation, notice that
VHMV = Tr (MVVH) = Tr (MW)
for any M ∈ Cn×n and W = VVH. Here, Tr stands for the trace operator.
The above representation reduces quadratic forms in V to linear forms in
W ∈ Cn×n. Also, any W that admits the representation W = VVH is a
rank-1 positive semidefinite matrix (henceforth denoted W  0). Therefore,
one can reformulate PAC by replacing all quadratic forms in V by linear
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expressions in W and enforce W to be a rank-1 positive semidefinite matrix.
This reformulation encodes the nonconvexity of PAC in the rank constraint.









subject to pGk − pDk = Tr (ΦkW), (4.6a)
qGk − qDk = Tr (ΨkW), (4.6b)
Tr (Φk`W) ≤ fk`, (4.6c)
p
k
≤ pGk ≤ pk, qk ≤ q
G
k ≤ qk, (4.6d)
v2k ≤ Tr (1k1HkW) ≤ v2k, (4.6e)
W  0, (4.6f)
for k = 1, . . . , n, ` ∼ k
over the variables W,pG,qG. For any variable z in PSDP, we use the notation
z? to denote z at an optimum.
We now define prices using the optimal Lagrange multipliers from PSDP.
The prices we advocate are locational in nature, i.e., they vary based on
location within the power network. However, the prices are uniform across
assets connected at the same bus. Toward that goal, associate the multipliers
λpk and λ
q
k to the real and reactive power balance constraints in (4.6a) and





to the upper and lower limits, respectively, on the real power generation in
(4.6d), and µqk, µ
q
k
to the respective limits on the reactive power generation
in (4.6d). Define µvk, µ
v
k
, respectively, as the multipliers for the upper and
lower bounds on voltage magnitudes in (4.6e). Finally, associate the matrix
U ∈ Cn×n as the multiplier for (4.6f).
Definition 1. Define λp,?k and λ
q,?
k , the optimal Lagrange multipliers from
PSDP for the real and reactive power balance constraints at bus k, respectively,
as the prices for real and reactive power at bus k.
The market proceeds as follows. The SO collects bids and offers from
market participants and solves the market clearing problem PAC to compute
the dispatch decisions pG,? and qG,?. Then, the SO solves PSDP and computes
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the optimal Lagrange multipliers λp,? and λq,? as the RLMPs. Under our


























to the SO. What justifies RLMPs for price formation in electricity markets?
We describe a wish-list of properties for market mechanisms and argue that
RLMPs exhibit a number of these desirable properties, thus providing the
rationale behind our proposed mechanism.
1. Efficient Market Equilibrium: The dispatch is said to be efficient and
clears the market, if it optimally solves PAC. It is individually ratio-
nal, if the SO prescribed dispatch indeed maximizes the profit of a
















k − ck(pGk , qGk ),
subject to p
k




given (λp,?k , λ
q,?
k ). A controllable asset then has no incentive to devi-
ate from its prescribed dispatch, given the prices. A pricing scheme
is nodally uniform if all assets connected at a bus pay or are paid at
the same price. Thus, co-located assets do not have incentives to trade
among themselves. A market mechanism supports an efficient mar-
ket equilibrium if the dispatch is efficient, clears the market, and is
individually rational, given nodally uniform prices.
2. Side Payment Minimization: When the dispatch mechanism incorpo-
rates non-convexities, it is typically challenging to find a set of nodally
uniform prices that adequately incentivize all assets to follow the SO-
prescribed dispatch. The SOs then provide side-payments to control-
lable assets to deter possible deviations. Such payments are often
socialized among end-use customers. Ideally, the market mechanism
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should minimize such out-of-market settlements in aggregate to in-
crease market transparency. Lost opportunity costs constitute a specific

































k − ck(pG,?k , qG,?k ). (4.9)
Said differently, given the electricity prices, πSOk denotes the profit of the
controllable asset at bus k from following the SO prescribed dispatch,
while πoptk is the maximum profit that asset can garner.
3. Revenue Adequacy: A market mechanism is revenue adequate if the
rents collected from power sales are enough to cover the rents payable








is non-negative. Non-negativity of MS ensures the solvency of the SO
after each market clearing.
4.4 Properties of RLMPs
Having described the qualities we seek in a market mechanism, we now char-
acterize the properties of RLMPs in Theorem 5, the proof of which relies
on duality theory of semidefinite programming. Assume throughout that
PSDP satisfies Slater’s condition. To present the result, we need the following
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definition.




















|V ?k |2 − v2k
) (4.11)
for µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0,U  0 as the product revenue shortfall, where V?
constitutes an optimal solution of PAC.
Theorem 5. PSDP is the dual of the dual problem of PAC, and the duality




LOC (λp, λq) + PRS(µ, µv, µv,U),



















µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, U  0.
When the duality gap is zero (rank W? = 1 in PSDP), then the proposed
market mechanism supports an efficient market equilibrium. Moreover, if the




v2k for k = 1, . . . , n, then the mechanism is revenue adequate.
The fact that PSDP is the double dual of PAC is well known, e.g., see [78, 87].
We include it in the result for completeness. The proof of the duality gap
in Theorem 5 is provided in Section 4.7. For a proof on revenue adequacy
and market equilibrium we refer the reader to [88]. Theorem 5 reveals that
when the duality gap is nonzero, RLMPs seek to minimize the sum of two
terms that are individually non-negative—the lost opportunity cost (LOC)
and the product revenue shortfall (PRS), very similar in spirit to convex hull
pricing (CHP). See [86, 72] for comparison. Having LOC as a component
implies that RLMP in a way attempts to minimize side payments necessary
to incentivize controllable assets to follow the SO’s dispatch signals, thereby
increasing market transparency. The economic interpretation of PRS remains
challenging—a feature that is again common to both RLMP and CHP. A
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nonzero PRS can give rise to counter-intuitive situations where prices can
be positive even with non-binding constraints. For example, one can end
up with µ?k` > 0 from PSDP together with fk` > VH,?Φk`V? from PAC. In
such an event, the SO will garner congestion revenue, even when the line
may not be congested at an optimal dispatch. This again is a property
that CHP exhibits. Notice that PRS in (4.11) collects terms that appear in
complementary slackness conditions for PAC. However, the primal and the
dual variables come from two different problems. Thus, when the duality gap
is nonzero, one cannot expect the complementary slackness-like condition to
hold. Theorem 5 indicates that RLMP tries to force PRS towards zero,
similar in spirit to CHP. These parallels between CHP and RLMP are not
surprising, given that both advocate pricing based on the dual (or the double
dual) of the nonconvex market clearing problem, albeit to tackle two different
kinds of nonconvexities. Understanding how RLMPs compare to the optimal
dual multipliers of a local optimum of the dispatch problem is an interesting
subject for future research.
When the duality gap is zero, Theorem 5 establishes that RLMPs have
similar properties as LMPs. No controllable asset has incentive to deviate
from the dispatch described by the optimal solution of PAC. Under the addi-
tional condition of non-binding lower bounds for voltage constraints at each
bus, the payments from uncontrollable assets cover the rents of those that
are controllable. Given the strong coupling between reactive power injection
and voltage magnitudes, one expects non-negative MS with adequate reac-
tive power support. For illustrative examples on the fact that non-binding
lower voltage limit is sufficient but not necessary, we refer the reader to [88].
Despite progress in wholesale electricity markets, the low-voltage distribu-
tion grid has been largely excluded from day-ahead and real-time markets.
The role of distribution grids is largely passive with commercial and residen-
tial customers exposed to fixed or time-of-use rates that do not reflect real
time conditions of the system. However, rapid proliferation of distributed
energy resources (DERs) and the aim to harness demand flexibility of end-
use customers have motivated research in defining appropriate price signals
for compensating energy transactions in distribution networks (e.g., see [89],
[90] and [91]). Suggested distribution LMPs (DLMPs) aim to reflect the lo-
cational value of DERs and physics of the network as discussed in [92] and
[93]. We argue that RLMPs from PSDP become the second-order cone pro-
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gramming (SOCP) based DLMPs in [90] over radial (acyclic) distribution
grids. Indeed, in [88, 94] we show that RLMPs restricted to radial networks
coincides with DLMPs. Such prices are locational in nature and compensate
market participants for both real and reactive power.
Our exposition in [94] focus on the mathematical foundations of DLMPs
and sidestep a range of issues surrounding the adoption of such prices in
practice. For example, what is the right trading platform that needs to be
established and what products should be traded in such platforms that DERs
can participate in? How should such platforms coordinate their operations
with wholesale markets governed by transmission system operators? See [95]
and [96] for insightful discussions on the same. We align with the view in [23]
to consider a retail market operated by an independent distribution system
operator (DSO) responsible for the dispatch and pricing of DERs, but leave
the specifics of a coordinated wholesale-retail market design to a future effort.
4.5 Practical Considerations for Market Adoption
RLMPs associate prices for real and reactive power, thereby making reactive
power compensation a part of competitive market processes. Creation of
markets for reactive power has led to celebrated debates in the last two
decades, e.g., see [97, 98, 99]. Reactive power is alleged to not “travel too
far” and hence, a market is often deemed unnecessary. However, real and
reactive power are intimately coupled with each other through the power flow
equations. Therefore, pricing one and not the other ignores that coupling.
Inadequate reactive power resources, especially under line/generator failure
scenarios (contingencies), can lead to brown and blackouts (see [100]). To
keep the notation simple, we have not modeled contingencies in formulating
PAC/PSDP. That extension, however does not offer any conceptual difficulties.
With such an extension, a competitive market for both real and reactive
power will systematize the procurement process for both.
Pricing via RLMPs requires the SO to solve PSDP. SDPs are known to
scale poorly with problem dimension and pose serious algorithmic challenges
to possible adoption of RLMPs. The difficulty typically arises from the need
to solve large linear system of equations within interior-point methods to
solve PSDP that require O(n3) operations. Such scaling is prohibitive for
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practical power systems. In [80, 83], it has been shown that PSDP can be
equivalently formulated in terms of semidefinite matrices corresponding to
maximal cliques of chordal extensions of the sparse power network graph.
The size of the largest maximal clique then determines the size of the semidef-
inite matrices involved in the computational step, and also the size of the
linear systems solved at each iteration. In other words, the sparsity of the
power network allows orders of magnitude speedups in algorithms for PSDP.
While algorithms to solve PSDP have come a long way (see [101, 84]), addi-
tional research is required to make it scalable for market adoption. Surpris-
ingly enough, CHPs have faced the same difficulty in tractable computation,
although for a completely different reason (see [70, 69]).
There are additional concerns in adopting RLMPs for day-ahead markets.
Algorithms for market clearing with linearized power flows and unit com-
mitment decisions lead to mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs). Software
for MILP is much more mature than the nonlinear counterpart (see [102]).
Thus, adoption of RLMP for day-ahead markets will impose a heavy com-
putational burden on market clearing software. In addition, one needs a way
to enhance RLMP to price commitment decisions—a topic we are eager to
pursue in future work.
4.6 Illustrative Examples
In this section, we report results from numerical experiments on different
power network examples to illustrate the behavior of RLMPs as well as to
discuss main insights from our theoretical results. In our first experiment,
we compute the RLMPs on the IEEE 30-bus test system adopted from Mat-
power, developed by [103]. Reactive power demands are computed from the
real power demands, assuming a lagging power factor of 0.9. The result-
ing RLMPs for real and reactive power across the network are illustrated
through heatmaps in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b respectively. An increase in real
and reactive power demands at buses 29 and 30 demonstrate the locational
nature of these prices. In particular, once the real power demand on bus 30
exceeds the flow limit on branch 29-30, the prices for both real and reactive
power at buses 29 and 30 significantly exceed those at other locations in the
network, as Figures 4.1c and 4.1d reveal. In effect, these prices reflect that in
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the presence of congestion it becomes more expensive to supply demand at
buses 29 and 30. We then narrow the voltage magnitude limits on a subset
of nodes; the effect on RLMPs is illustrated in Figures 4.1e and 4.1f for real
and reactive power prices, respectively. The impact is significantly larger
on reactive power prices than on real power prices. Intuitively, maintaining
the voltage level within acceptable bounds across the network requires suffi-
cient injections of reactive power in the appropriate locations on the network.
Thus, enforcing stricter voltage limits, increases demand for reactive power
injections and therefore their RLMPs. For further insights on RLMPs as well
as their applications to distribution grids see [88, 94].
4.7 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof proceeds in four steps. The first step establishes that the dual
program of PAC coincides with the dual of PSDP. This part of the proof is
provided in [88]. In the second step, we compute the duality gap of PAC. We
find that the duality gap constitutes of two terms: the LOC and PRS. The




































































subject to µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0.
(4.13)






























































subject to µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, U  0, (4.14).
(4.15)
Therefore, (4.15) defines the common dual program of PAC and PSDP. With
Slater’s condition, strong duality holds for PSDP, and hence, the optimal cost
of PSDP is the same as that of (4.15). Call this cost c∗SDP.
















Then, the nodal demands satisfy
pDk = p
G,?
k −VH,?ΦkV?, qDk = qG,?k −VH,?ΨkV?. (4.17)
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that using the notation in (4.9) allows us to rearrange (4.15) as










































LOC (λp,λq) + η(λp,λq,µ,µv,µv,U)
subject to µ ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, µv ≥ 0, U  0, (4.14),























It remains to show that η indeed equals PRS. To that end, utilize the defini-
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where the last line follows from the definition of PRS in (4.11). This com-
pletes the derivation of the duality gap of PAC.
Steps 3 and 4 show that when the relaxation is exact or equivalently when
rank W? = 1, prices defined as the Langrange of PSDP support an efficient
market equilibrium. Moreover, when the voltage lower bound is inactive,
revenue adequacy is of the SO is guaranteed. The proof of these steps is
provided in [88].
4.8 Summary
The non-convex nature of the market clearing problem PAC with AC power
flow introduces challenges in defining appropriate price signals to compensate
grid-connected assets in electricity markets. In this chapter, we addressed
the question: what price signals are deemed meaningful for market clearing
with AC power flow? We proposed and analyzed relaxation-based locational
marginal prices (RLMPs) for real and reactive power, based on optimal dual
multipliers of the SDP relaxation of the market clearing problem. Our mar-
ket model relies on a central entity, the system operator, that determines the
dispatch for all grid-connected assets from the solution of PAC while the com-
pensation of each market participant is derived from the optimal Lagrange
multipliers of PSDP. We showed that when the duality gap of the market
clearing problem is zero, RLMPs support an efficient market equilibrium
and the mechanism is revenue adequate under mild conditions—properties
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that are reminiscent of LMPs defined with linear power flow models. With
nonzero duality gap, we proved that RLMPs possess properties similar to
convex hull prices. We also argued that RLMPs adapted to acyclic distribu-





Figure 4.1: Plots (a), (b) show heatmaps of RLMP on the 30-bus IEEE
network. Plots (c), (d) are derived with pD26 = 7.5, q
D
26 = 3.3, p
D
29 = 12.2,
qD29 = 4.9, p
D
30 = 16.1, and q
D
30 = 5.9. Plots (e), (f) are derived with vk = 0.99,




MARKET FOR DISTRIBUTION GRIDS
In this chapter, we extend the electricity market model and pricing mecha-
nism developed in Chapter 4 to a multi-phase, unbalanced distribution grid
together with the demand bids and supply offers introduced in Chapter 2.
RLMPs together with scalar-parameterized offers/bids serve as the vehicle
to design a comprehensive framework for competitive electricity markets at
the retail sector.
5.1 Why Markets for Electricity Retail?
The current state of distribution grids is passive. Low-voltage customers con-
sume power and DERs inject power whenever it becomes available without
any coordination with the rest of the system. It is then, the responsibility of
the distribution system operator (DSO) to ensure network constraints while
the SO at the transmission level ensures sufficient reserves to meet imbal-
ances in supply and demand. Retail and commercial customers are largely
excluded from any market process since they are exposed to fixed time-of-
use rates that do not reflect the real-time conditions of the system. The
paradigm shift envisioned in recent works [104, 90] entails a move toward ac-
tive participation of low-voltage suppliers and consumers to potential market
mechanisms designed for the retail side of the grid. This shift is propelled by
the rapid proliferation of DERs in low and medium voltage distribution grids,
which has generated considerable interest in designing appropriate price sig-
nals for distribution networks, e.g., see [89, 91, 23, 105].
The first fundamental question that emerges is what price signals are
deemed appropriate and meaningful to compensate such resources and mo-
tivate them to offer their services to the grid. To this end, we utilize the
concept of RLMPs developed in Chapter 4. Specifically, we consider a cen-
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tral dispatch problem for a local market in the low voltage grid administered
by the DSO. The DSO clears the market for real and reactive power and
determines the DLMPs at every node in the distribution grid. In this mar-
ket, generation assets submit supply offers and consumers submit demand
bids. The DSO determines the cleared bids and offers over a particular time
horizon.
In contrast to the bulk power system, where linearized lossless power flow
models are often deemed acceptable, distribution networks must explicitly
account for reactive power flows and voltage considerations. In particular,
distribution grids typically have lines with relatively high resistance to reac-
tance ratios, and reactive power transactions play a crucial role in maintain-
ing voltage magnitudes within tight bounds. Hence, the analysis of DLMPs
becomes more complicated as we cannot ignore losses and reactive power—
often a source of non-linearities in the dispatch model. However, the radial
topology of distribution grids implies that loop flows, which have lead to
heated debates surrounding LMPs, are less of a concern in DLMPs. The
central dispatch model considered here, captures such characteristics of dis-
tribution grids. Specifically, in Section 5.2 we set up the network model that
constitutes the backbone of the central dispatch problem. We define DLMPs
as the optimal Lagrange multipliers of a semidefinite relaxation of the origi-
nal dispatch problem. When market actors compete in scalar-parameterized
offers/bids, we show that DLMPs support the efficient dispatch when the
relaxation is exact.
5.2 Three-Phase, Unbalanced Distribution Grid Model
Distribution grids in practice are often multi-phase with a radial topology. In
a distribution network, components such as capacitor banks and tap-changing
transformers play a vital role in maintaining voltage magnitudes within speci-
fied limits. In this thesis, we ignore the tap-changing transformers and model
the distribution grid as a three-phase network with shunt elements at each
node. We also include controllable and uncontrollable assets operated by
asset-owners at the various nodes of the network.
Throughout, let R and C denote the sets of real and complex numbers,
respectively. Let Hn×n denote the space of all n-by-n Hermitian matrices. For
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y ∈ C, denote its real and imaginary parts by <(x) and =(y), respectively,
and i :=
√
−1. For any scalar, vector, or matrix A, let Aᵀand AH denote its
transpose and conjugate transpose, respectively. Throughout Chapter 5 we
slightly abuse notation and do not use boldface to denote vector quantities
as we did in previous chapters. For a column vector A, let diag(A) denote
a diagonal matrix with entries of A on the diagonal. For a square matrix
A, let diag(A) denote a column vector consisted of its diagonal entries. Let
Tr (A) denote the trace of a square matrix A.
Let N = {0, 1, ..., n} denote the set of nodes in a multi-phase radial distri-
bution network. Represent the network by a directed graph with E as the
collections of directed edges. For i, j ∈ N, the edge i → j ∈ E represents
a line joining nodes i and j. We assume that all the nodes i ∈ N and lines
i→ j ∈ E have three phases: a, b, c collectively defined by Φ = {a, b, c}. For
i ∈ N and φ ∈ Φ, let V φi denote the voltage phasor on phase φ at bus i. For
i → j ∈ E, let Iφij denote the phase φ current on the line from node i to j.














ᵀ. Let symmetric matrix
yi := ibi ∈ C3×3 denote the shunt admittance at node i, and symmetric
matrix zij := rij + ixij ∈ C3×3 denote the series impedance of line i → j.
If a particular phase is missing on certain node or line, the corresponding
entries in current/power vectors and impedance/admittance matrices are set
to zero.
We adopt a multi-phase, unbalanced distribution network model presented
in [106] with some modifications. In this thesis, we ignore the delta-connected
variables. Thermal considerations are included in this thesis as limits on both
sending and receiving ends for real power on each line in E. The network
should satisfy the following constraints:
1. Ohm’s law:
Vi − Vj = zijIij, ∀i→ j ∈ E. (5.1)
2. Definition of auxiliary variables:
lij = IijI
H
ij , Sij = ViI
H









diag(Ski−zkilki)+diag(ViV Hi yHi ), ∀i ∈ N.
(5.3)
4. Thermal constraints:
diag(Pij) ≤ fij, diag(<(zijlij)− Pij) ≤ fij. (5.4)
5. Voltage magnitude:
V φi ≤ |V φi | ≤ V
φ
i , ∀φ ∈ Φ. (5.5)
We introduce the following auxiliary variable for the voltage at node i
wi := ViV
H
i ∈ H3×3, ∀i ∈ N. (5.6)
Notice that diag(wi) denotes the squared magnitude of three phases of
voltage Vi. The voltage constraint in (5.5) becomes
vi ≤ diag(wi) ≤ vi, (5.7)






















, ∀i ∈ N. (5.8)
Given the definition of wi and utilizing (5.1) we obtain:







ij − ViIHijzHij − zijIijV Hi
= wi − (SijzHij + zijSHij) + zijlijzHij. (5.9)
We can rewrite (5.3) in terms of real and reactive power balance con-
straints. Define the real and imaginary parts of the following auxiliary vari-
ables:
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Since wi, lij are Hermitian, the following properties hold
(wRi )
ᵀ













Then, the nodal power balance constraints in (5.3) can be equivalently
written as
























In (5.4), note that the real part of zijlij can be explicitly written as
<(zijlij) = rijlRij − xijlIij. (5.16)
Moreover, since diag(wi) denotes squared magnitude of three phase voltages
at node i, it is equivalent to diag(wRi ).
We associate with each node i a set J (i) of controllable generation re-




k ∈ C3 for
k ∈ J (i). Moreover, we assume that a set I(i) of consumers is connected




k ∈ C3 for k ∈ I(i). Assume
each generation resource can produce power within some capacity limits:
pG
k
≤ pGk ≤ pGk ,
qG
k
≤ qGk ≤ qGk ,
(5.17)










denote the minimum demand for real and reactive power that must be
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supplied to consumer k ∈ I(i). Finally, assume each generation asset incurs
costs Ck associated with production of amount p
G
k and each consumer receives
utility Uk from meeting load p
D
k .
5.3 Distribution Locational Marginal Prices
Assume the DSO has knowledge on the private costs and utilities of market
participants. Then, the market allocation would be determined from the












































Qki − xkilRki − rkilIki
)
, (5.18c)





ij − xijlIij − Pij
)
≤ fij, (5.18e)
vi ≤ diag(wRi ) ≤ vi, (5.18f)
0 ≤ pGk ≤ pGk , k ∈ J (i) (5.18g)
0 ≤ qGk ≤ qGk , k ∈ J (i) (5.18h)
pDk ≥ pDk , q
D











for all i ∈ N, i→ j ∈ E,
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k ∈ R3 and Pij, Qij, lRij, lIij, wRi , wIi ∈ R3×3.
Note that (5.18j)-(5.18k) ensure that the network constraints formulated in
the auxiliary variables in PAC are equivalent to (5.1)-(5.5). This reformula-
tion is useful in order to derive the convex surrogate of PAC via semidefinite













which is consistent with the definition of the auxiliary variables wi, lij and
explains why the semidefinite constraint (5.18j) and the rank-1 constraint
(5.18k) must hold. The non-convexity of the dispatch problem in (5.18)
lies in the rank-1 condition (5.18k). When the dispatch problem is non-
convex, there may not exist a set of prices such that market participants are
incentivized to follow the DSO-prescribed dispatch [74, 72, 86]. To get around
this difficulty, we propose prices derived as the optimal dual multipliers of a
convex relaxation of (5.18). In particular, dropping the non-convex, rank-1












subject to (5.18a)− (5.18j) (5.20b)
for all i ∈ N, i→ j ∈ E.
When the optimal solution of PSDP satisfies the rank-1 condition in (5.18k)
of PAC, then we say the SDP relaxation is exact and an unique voltage and
current vector (V ?, I?) can be recovered from the auxiliary variables (w?, l?)
[107]. Associate Lagrange multipliers λpi , λ
q
i ∈ R3 with the real and reactive
power balance constraints (5.18b)-(5.18c), respectively.
Definition 2. The relaxation-based DLMPs for multi-phase, real and reactive
power at node i ∈ N are defined as the optimal Lagrange multipliers λp,?i and
λq,?i obtained from the solution of PSDP.
The problem with PSDP is that the DSO is agnostic to the the true utilities
and cost functions of market participants. Hence, we require suppliers and
consumers to submit offers and bids to reveal their preferences to the DSO.
To this end, in Section 5.4 we exploit the family of scalar-parameterized
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supply offers/bids to arrive at an optimal solution of PSDP.
5.4 Two-Sided Electricity Market for Distribution
Grids
We consider a market mechanism based on scalar-parameterized supply offers
and demand bids introduced in Chapter 2. Specifically, let generation asset
owner k connected at node i submit to the DSO a multi-phase offer θGk ∈ R3+
with the understanding that they are willing to supply up to
pGk := p
G
k − θGk  λpk, ∀ k ∈ J (i), (5.21)
when faced with the a positive, multi-phase price λpi at node i. In (5.21),
ab denotes the Hadamard division of vectors a and b. When θGk = 0, power
producer i submit their full generation capacity, and ever decreasing values as
θGk grows large. We assume that each power supplier submits only offers for
real power; there are no offers for reactive power in the market. Similarly, let
consumer k connected at node i submit to the DSO the multi-phase demand




+ θDk  λpk, ∀ k ∈ I(i), (5.22)
given price vector λpk. Notice that the p
D
k is a function of the price at bus i and
consists of the inelastic demand pD
k
and the price-responsive part θDk λpk. The
higher the market price, the lower the desired quantity by power consumer
k located at node i. Again, we assume that there are no demand bids for
reactive power. However, consumers (producers) pay (are paid) the DSO for
the reactive power they consume (supply). This is a standard assumption
in the design of retail electricity markets [90]. Given the supply offers and
demand bids, the DSO seeks to solve a central dispatch problem with the
objective to maximize the induced social welfare while respecting various


















subject to (5.18a)− (5.18j) (5.23b)
for all i ∈ N, i→ j ∈ E.
Our goal is to investigate whether, given (θDk , θ
G
k ) from each individual partic-
ipant’s profit maximization problem, there exist prices (λp, λq) such that the
resulting allocations (pGk , q
G




k ) are solutions to PSDP. Moreover,
if said dispatch satisfies the rank-1 condition, then the market mechanism in
(5.23) yields efficient allocations, i.e., allocations that solve PAC. We formal-
ize the previous discussion in the following definition.
Definition 3. The supply offer profile (θG, qG), demand bid profile (θD, qD)
together with prices (λp, λq) constitute a market equilibrium if they satisfy the
following conditions:
• Individual rationality for all controllable assets: At each node i ∈ N,
given prices λpi , λ
q
















k − Ck(pGk − θGk  λpi )
|0 ≤ θGk ≤ θG,maxk , 0 ≤ qGk ≤ qGk
}
. (5.24)


















|θDk ≥ 0, qDk ≥ qDk
}
. (5.25)

















k at each node i ∈ N over the













k , wi, Pij, Qij, lij
)
satisfy (5.18a)-
(5.18j) for all k ∈ J (i), I(i), i ∈ N, i→ j ∈ E.
• The DSO solves Pθ: For every k ∈ J (i), I(i), i ∈ N, i → j ∈ E, there
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k , wi, Pij, Qij, lij
)
optimizes Pθ.
The second property that we seek in a pricing mechanism is revenue ade-
quacy. We formally describe this in the following definition.











k ∈ I(i),J (i) and i ∈ N define a revenue adequate market mechanism if the





















We now present our main result.
Theorem 6. Let the multi-phase, unbalanced dispatch problem PAC be strictly
feasible. There exist prices (λp, λq) such that
(
θG, qG, θD, qD, λp, λq
)
consti-
tute a market equilibrium. Moreover, the following assertions hold:
• For every i ∈ N, i→ j ∈ E, the dispatch (pGk , qGk , pDk , qDk , wi, Pij, Qij, lij),




i ), for k ∈ J (i) and pDk = D(θDk , λpk), for k ∈ I(i),
is an optimal solution to PSDP.
• If the optimal solution of PSDP satisfies the rank-1 condition in (5.18k),
then
(
θG, qG, θD, qD, λp, λq
)
support an efficient market equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 6 is provided in Section 5.5. Theorem 6 establishes a
fundamental property of DLMPs: they always support an optimal dispatch of
PSDP, and an efficient dispatch whenever the relaxation is exact. This implies
that, given DLMPs, each market participant has no incentive to deviate from
the DSO-prescribed dispatch. This result demonstrates that said DLMPs
together with the bid/offer structures, constitute a promising mechanism for
the design of retail electricity markets. However, in addition to support of
efficient market equilibria, said mechanism must yield non-negative MS. We
relegate the proof of revenue adequacy to future efforts.
In terms of physical intuition, numerical studies on distribution feeders are
required to illustrate how voltage constraints, congestion and losses influence
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said DLMPs. In [106], the authors perform numerical simulations of PSDP
(including delta-connected loads) and demonstrate numerical exactness of
the relaxed model with respect to voltages and branch flows. This indicates
that one can recover the values of (V ?, I?) that are optimal for PAC, which
provides validity to the central dispatch modeled considered in Section 5.3.
Understanding conditions for which the semidefinite relaxation of PAC is ex-
act, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Interested readers are referred to
[106, 108, 109] and references therein for insightful discussions.
Our exposition focuses on the mathematical foundations of DLMPs and
sidesteps a range of issues surrounding the adoption of such prices in practice.
For example, what is the right trading platform that needs to be established
and what products should be traded in such platforms that DERs can par-
ticipate in? How should such platforms coordinate their operations with
wholesale markets governed by transmission system operators? See [95] and
[96] for insightful discussions on the same. We align with the view in [23] to
consider a retail market operated by an independent distribution system op-
erator (DSO) responsible for the dispatch and pricing of DERs, but leave the
specifics of a coordinated wholesale-retail market design to a future effort.
5.5 Proof of Theorem 6
We begin by proving the first assertion. To show that at a market equilib-
rium, defined in Definition 3, the resulting allocation is an optimal dispatch
of PSDP, we utilize the KKT conditions of PSDP and show they are equivalent
to those satisfied by a market equilibrium.
To motivate the proof, we first write the complex constraints in PSDP as
real-valued constraints. Given (5.10)-(5.12), complex constraint (5.18a) can











ijxij − xijlIijrij), (5.27)
wIj =w
I
i − (xijP ᵀij − Pijxij +Qijrij − rijQᵀij )
+ (rijl
I
ijrij − rijlRijxij + xijlRijrij + xijlIijxij). (5.28)
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For all i ∈ N and i→ j ∈ E, associate Lagrange multiplier vectors λpi , λqi to
the real and reactive power constraints (5.18b)-(5.18c) in PSDP, respectively.
Similarly, associate vectors αij, α
′
ij to the line thermal limits (5.18d)-(5.18e).






to the upper and lower bounds on real and re-
active power generation (5.18g)-(5.18h), respectively. Associate Lagrange
multipliers γd
k





as the multipliers for the squared voltage upper and lower constraints in
(5.18f). For (5.27)-(5.28), let matrices νRij , ν
I
ij be the multipliers, respectively.
Finally, we assign matrix σij as the multiplier for the positive semi-definite




























Since wi, lij are Hermitian matrices, their corresponding multipliers σ
w
ij and









skew-symmetric. Given (5.10)-(5.12), the term associated with the semi-




























































































The last equality follows from






















































= −Tr (X) = 0. (5.33)
Since PSDP is convex, the Slater’s condition holds and the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions in Figure 5.1 are necessary and suffi-
cient. The KKT conditions are all real-valued. Notation 0n×m denotes an
n-by-m matrix with zero entries.
From Definition 3, in order for (θG, qG, θD, qD, λp, λq) to be a market equi-
librium, the following conditions must hold.
For each generation asset k ∈ J (i), the optimality conditions yield:
1. Primal feasibility:
















i , 0 ≤ θGk < θG,maxk ,
≥ λpi , 0 < θGk ≤ θG,maxk ,
∀ k ∈ J (i) (5.38)




k − θGk ) = 0, µθkθ
G




k − qGk ) = 0, µqkq
G
k = 0. (5.40)
For each consumer k ∈ I(i), the optimality conditions yield:
1. Primal feasibility:

















= λpi , θ
D
k > 0,
∀ k ∈ I(i) (5.43)








k − qDk ) = 0. (5.45)
At a market equilibrium, the DSO solves Pθ. The KKT for Pθ yield:
1. Primal feasibility: (5.18a)-(5.18j), for i ∈ N, i→∈ E.







≥ 0, σij  0.








+ θDk  λpi . (5.46b)
4. Complementary slackness: (5.35a), (5.35e), (5.35f).
Complementary slackness of Pθ together with (5.40) and (5.45) are equiv-
alent to (5.35a)-(5.35f) under the maps (5.46a) and (5.46b). Specifically, it
















. The rest of the
dual variables are the same. Primal feasibility of Pθ together with (5.36) and
(5.41) are equivalent to primal feasibility conditions of PSDP. Dual feasibility
of Pθ together with (5.37) and (5.42) are equivalent to dual feasibility condi-
tions of PSDP. Finally, (5.38),(5.39), (5.43), (5.44) together with the gradient
conditions of Pθ, are equivalent (5.34c)-(5.34f). The previous discussion es-
tablishes that at a market equilibrium, the resulting allocation is an optimal
solution to PSDP. If at the given solution, the rank-1 condition is also satis-
fied, then the duality gap of PAC and PSDP is zero and the optimal allocation
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from PSDP is also an optimal solution of PAC. Hence, (θg, qG, θD, qD, λp, λq)
supports an efficient allocation. This completes the proof.
5.6 Summary
We presented a central dispatch model for multi-phase, unbalanced distribu-
tion grids. The dispatch model incorporates multi-phase, supply offers and
demand bids from market participants connected at the low-voltage end of
the grid. A central market-maker, the DSO, determines the allocation for
real and reactive power at each node of the grid together with the DLMPs,
which are used to compensate resources at every location. We showed that
when market actors compete in scalar-parameterized offers/bids and the re-
laxation is exact, DLMPs support efficient market equilibria. This result
demonstrates the applicability of said offers/bids in a wide range of market
settings and competition models. In future efforts, we aim to establish the
revenue adequacy of proposed DLMPs and perform numerical simulations to
reveal how structural network characteristics impact the behavior of DLMPs.
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Primal feasibility conditions: (5.18a)-(5.18j), for i ∈ N, i→∈ E.




















0, σ?ij  0.
Gradient conditions: For i ∈ N, i→ j ∈ E,
diag(λp,?i − λ
p,?
j ) + diag(α
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≤ λp,?i , 0 < p
G,?
k ≤ pGk
















≤ λp,?k , p
D,?
k ≥ pDk





, ∀ k ∈ I(i), (5.34e)
λq,?i − δ
d,?
k = 0, ∀ k ∈ I(i), (5.34f)
−diag(λq,?i )bi + diag(µ
w,?





















ij = 03×3, (5.34h)
rij diag(λ
p,?
j ) + xij diag(λ
q,?
j ) + rij diag(α
′,?
ij ) + rijν
R,?
ij rij + xijν
R,?
ij xij
−rijνI,?ij xij + xijν
I,?
ij rij + σ
l,R,?,ᵀ
ij = 03×3, (5.34i)
−xij diag(λp,?j ) + rij diag(λ
q,?
j )− xij diag(α
′,?
ij ) + rijν
R,?





ij rij + xijν
I,?
ij xij − σ
l,I,?,ᵀ
ij = 03×3, (5.34j)






















− pG,?k ) = 03×1, (5.35b)
diag(µq,?k )
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This thesis presented allocation and pricing mechanisms for competitive elec-
tricity markets. The market allocation mechanism is based on a particular
family of scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Under these
offer/bid structures, we analyzed a generic, two-sided market and demon-
strated a number of useful properties including support for efficient market
allocations, existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and its explicit charac-
terization, and bounded efficiency loss and price markup at the equilibrium.
We demonstrated how scalar-parameterized mechanisms adequately capture
the primary means by which market power is exercised in electricity markets,
e.g., through the economic withholding of generation capacity. This allowed
us to extend the two-sided competition model over a power network with
additional considerations on network security and reliability.
We demonstrated the analytical strengths of scalar-parameterized offers in
the study of inter-regional electricity markets where these offers are utilized to
model a game among pure price-arbitrageurs. Support for efficient outcomes
together with efficiency bounds under strategic interactions are demonstrated
when players face affine price spreads. In addition, through application of
reinforcement learning algorithms we showed that computed Nash equilibria
can be learned by the players in a setting of imperfect information.
A comprehensive competition framework for electricity markets cannot ig-
nore the underlying physics of power grids and security considerations. Mo-
tivated by the increased customer participation at the low-voltage side of
the grid, we explored pricing mechanisms when the central dispatch problem
incorporates losses, reactive power and voltage constraints—sources of non-
linearities and non-convexities. To this end, we exploited semidefinite relax-
ations of the optimal power flow problem to leverage the extensive literature
on pricing based on duality theory. We proposed and analyzed relaxation-
based LMPs (RLMPs) and illustrated a number of key properties that ren-
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der RLMPs meaningful price signals to compensate electricity market actors.
Moving toward the design of a retail electricity market, we utilized RLMPs
together with scalar-parameterized offers/bids, and explicitly constructed the
central market clearing problem solved by a distribution market maker. We
defined prices for real and reactive power, referred to as DLMPs, and showed
that such prices together with the offer-based participation mechanism, sup-
port efficient market allocations.
There are several interesting directions for future research. First, with
regard to the two-sided competition model with scalar-parameterized of-
fers/bids, a study of the market outcomes when only one group (suppliers
or consumers) are strategic would provide further insights on the nature of
competition. We analyzed one-sided competition under affine demand func-
tions in Chapter 3. Perhaps exploration of strategic interactions under other
families of demand functions would reveal further properties of said offer
structures. We briefly explored how, under certain conditions, competition
in scalar-parameterized supply functions sustains Cournot outcomes, draw-
ing interesting parallels with existing literature on pure price competition
models. Establishing the general framework and conditions under which
scalar-parameterized supply function competition yields similar outcomes to
Bertrand-Cournot models, is another interesting direction for future research.
Moreover, understanding how uncertainty on the maximum production ca-
pacity and/or minimum inelastic demand affects dispatch solutions would
provide useful insights in electricity market design, given the deepening pen-
etration of stochastic renewable generation.
The development of a systematic framework for a retail market that lever-
ages our RLMP-based DLMPs with a clearly defined role for the DSO and
the information exchanged with the SO, is another direction for future re-
search. Furthermore, we plan to combine our analysis on RLMPs with that
of CHPs analyzed by [72] and [86] to account for non-convexity in market
clearing problems that arise due to power flow equations and integer commit-
ment decisions. Finally, we intend to establish a general theory of pricing in
non-convex markets along the lines of [110] to include non-convexity due to
physical constraints of an underlying network. Such an analysis has potential
applications beyond electricity markets, e.g., for gas networks as in [111].
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Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 1290–1300, 2009.
[65] F. Wu, P. Varaiya, P. Spiller, and S. Oren, “Folk theorems on trans-
mission access: Proofs and counterexamples,” Journal of Regulatory
Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 5–23, Jul 1996.
[66] W. W. Hogan, “Contract networks for electric power transmission,”
Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 211–242, Sep 1992.
[67] R. P. O’Neill, P. M. Sotkiewicz, B. F. Hobbs, M. H. Rothkopf, and
W. R. Stewart, “Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with non-
convexities,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 164, no. 1,
pp. 269 – 285, 2005.
[68] W. W. Hogan and B. J. Ring, “On minimum-uplift pric-
ing for electricity markets,” March 2003, [Online]. Available:
https://tinyurl.com/y9jlar8q.
[69] C. Vazquez, M. Rivier, and I. J. Perez-Arriaga, “Production cost min-
imization versus consumer payment minimization in electricity pools,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 119–127,
2002.
[70] B. Hua and R. Baldick, “A convex primal formulation for convex hull
pricing,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 32, no. 5, pp.
3814–3823, 2017.
104
[71] F. Zhao, P. B. Luh, J. H. Yan, G. A. Stern, and S. Chang, “Pay-
ment cost minimization auction for deregulated electricity markets with
transmission capacity constraints,” IEEE Transactions on Power Sys-
tems, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 532–544, 2008.
[72] P. Gribik, W. W Hogan, and S. L Pope, “Market clearing electricity
prices and energy uplift,” p. 46, 01 2007.
[73] M. Garcia, H. Nagarajan, and R. Baldick, “Generalized convex hull
pricing for the AC optimal power flow problem,” IEEE Transactions
on Control of Network Systems, 2020.
[74] E. Litvinov, “Design and operation of the locational marginal prices-
based electricity markets,” IET generation, transmission & distribu-
tion, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 315–323, 2010.
[75] L. Monitoring Analytics, “2018 State of the market report for PJM,”
Independent Market Monitor for PJM Report; Monitoring Analytics,
LLC: Southeastern, PA, USA, March 2019.
[76] F. Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), “Reactive power require-
ments for non-synchronous generation,” June 2016, [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/06/23/2016-
14764/reactive-power-requirements-for-non-synchronous-generation.
[77] X. Bai, H. Wei, K. Fujisawa, and Y. Wang, “Semidefinite programming
for optimal power flow problems,” International Journal of Electrical
Power & Energy Systems, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 383–392, 2008.
[78] J. Lavaei and S. H. Low, “Zero duality gap in optimal power flow
problem,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 27, no. 1, pp.
92–107, 2012.
[79] S. Bose, D. F. Gayme, K. M. Chandy, and S. H. Low, “Quadratically
constrained quadratic programs on acyclic graphs with application to
power flow,” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 2,
no. 3, pp. 278–287, 2015.
[80] S. Bose, S. H. Low, T. Teeraratkul, and B. Hassibi, “Equivalent re-
laxations of optimal power flow,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 729–742, 2015.
[81] B. Zhang and D. Tse, “Geometry of injection regions of power net-
works,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 788–
797, May 2013.
105
[82] B. C. Lesieutre, D. K. Molzahn, A. R. Borden, and C. L. DeMarco,
“Examining the limits of the application of semidefinite programming
to power flow problems,” in 2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), Sep. 2011, pp.
1492–1499.
[83] R. Madani, S. Sojoudi, and J. Lavaei, “Convex relaxation for optimal
power flow problem: Mesh networks,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 199–211, 2014.
[84] R. Y. Zhang and J. Lavaei, “Sparse semidefinite programs with near-
linear time complexity,” in 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1624–1631.
[85] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Uplift cost allocation and
transparency in markets operated by regional transmission organiza-
tions and independent system operators,” April 2018, [Online]. Avail-
able: https://tinyurl.com/yax75zrl.
[86] D. A. Schiro, T. Zheng, F. Zhao, and E. Litvinov, “Convex hull pric-
ing in electricity markets: Formulation, analysis, and implementation
challenges,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 5, pp.
4068–4075, Sep. 2016.
[87] H. Wolkowicz, R. Saigal, and L. Vandenberghe, Handbook of Semidef-
inite Programming: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications. Springer
Science & Business Media, 2012, vol. 27.
[88] A. Winnicki, M. Ndrio, and S. Bose, “Convex relaxation based loca-
tional marginal prices for electricity markets,” October 2019, [Online].
Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.10673.
[89] E. Ntakou and M. Caramanis, “Price discovery in dynamic power mar-
kets with low-voltage distribution-network participants,” in 2014 IEEE
PES T D Conference and Exposition, April 2014, pp. 1–5.
[90] A. Papavasiliou, “Analysis of distribution locational marginal prices,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 4872–4882, Sep.
2018.
[91] Z. Yuan, M. R. Hesamzadeh, and D. R. Biggar, “Distribution locational
marginal pricing by convexified ACOPF and hierarchical dispatch,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 3133–3142, July
2018.
[92] Z. Li, W. Wu, M. Shahidehpour, and B. Zhang, “Adaptive robust tie-
line scheduling considering wind power uncertainty for interconnected
power systems,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 4,
pp. 2701–2713, July 2016.
106
[93] S. Huang, Q. Wu, S. S. Oren, R. Li, and Z. Liu, “Distribution loca-
tional marginal pricing through quadratic programming for congestion
management in distribution networks,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 2170–2178, July 2015.
[94] A. Winnicki, M. Ndrio, and S. Bose, “On convex relaxation-based
distribution locational marginal prices,” 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://boses.ece.illinois.edu/files/DLMP.pdf
[95] H. Gerard, E. Rivero, and D. Six, “Basic schemes for TSO-DSO coor-
dination and ancillary services provision,” Smartnet, Tech. Rep., 201.
[96] S. Bose and S. H. Low, “Some emerging challenges in electricity mar-
kets.” in Power Electronics and Power Systems. Springer, 2018.
[97] R. J. Thomas, T. D. Mount, R. E. Schuler, W. D. Schulze, R. D.
Zimmerman, D. L. Shawhan, and D. Toomey, “Markets for reactive
power and reliability: A white paper,” Dec 2006, [Online]. Available:
https://certs.lbl.gov/publications/markets-reactive-power-and.
[98] J. Zhong and K. Bhattacharya, “Toward a competitive market for re-
active power,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 17, no. 4,
pp. 1206–1215, 2002.
[99] P. Lipka, S. S. Oren, R. P. O’Neill, and A. Castillo, “Running a more
complete market with the SLP-IV-ACOPF,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 1139–1148, 2017.
[100] N. American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), “Technical analysis
of the August 14, 2003 blackout: What happened, why and what did we
learn?” July 2004, [Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/y6lyr2kr.
[101] A. Kalbat and J. Lavaei, “A fast distributed algorithm for decompos-
able semidefinite programs,” in 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Deci-
sion and Control (CDC), 2015, pp. 1742–1749.
[102] J. Lee and S. Leyffer, Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming. Springer
Science & Business Media, 2011, vol. 154.
[103] R. D. Zimmerman, C. E. Murillo-Sánchez, and D. Gan, “Matpower: A
MATLAB power system simulation package,” Manual, Power Systems
Engineering Research Center, Ithaca NY, vol. 1, 1997.
[104] R. Tabors, G. Parker, P. Centolella, and M. Caramanis, “White paper
on developing competitive electricity markets and pricing structures,”
Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich (TCR), White Paper, April 2016.
107
[105] P. M. Sotkiewicz and J. M. Vignolo, “Nodal pricing for distribution
networks: Efficient pricing for efficiency enhancing DG,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Power Systems, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 1013–1014, May 2006.
[106] C. Zhao, E. Dall-Anese, and S. H. Low, “Optimal power flow in mul-
tiphase radial networks with delta connections,” National Renewable
Energy Lab.(NREL), Golden, CO (United States), Tech. Rep., 2017.
[107] L. Gan and S. H. Low, “Convex relaxations and linear approximation
for optimal power flow in multiphase radial networks,” in 2014 Power
Systems Computation Conference. IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–9.
[108] L. Gan and S. H. Low, “Convex relaxations and linear approximation
for optimal power flow in multiphase radial networks,” in 2014 Power
Systems Computation Conference, 2014, pp. 1–9.
[109] X. Bai, H. Wei, K. Fujisawa, and Y. Wang, “Semidefinite programming
for optimal power flow problems,” International Journal of Electrical
Power Energy Systems, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 383 – 392, 2008.
[110] H. Scarf, “The allocation of resources in the presence of indivisibilities,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 111–128, 1994.
[111] A. Zlotnik, K. Sundar, A. M. Rudkevich, R. Tabors, X. Li et al.,
“Pipeline transient optimization for a gas-electric coordination deci-
sion support system,” in PSIG Annual Meeting. Pipeline Simulation
Interest Group, 2019.
108
